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Cyberensuring Security
JUSTIN (GUS) HURWITZ
Cybersecurity is one of the most pressing and legally difficult issues facing this
country today. It touches every aspect of modern political and social life, the
economy, and national security. From the OPM and IRS breaches, to the Sony hack,
to attacks on hospitals and health insurers, to attacks on domestic and international
infrastructure, to domestic and international surveillance, cybersecurity concerns
are omnipresent. For technical, legal, and practical, reasons, they also have proven
extremely difficult to address.
This Article draws from the economic literatures on strict liability and
insurance to argue that cyber incidents generally, and data breaches specifically,
should be treated as strict liability offenses. But that is only the starting point of this
Article’s argument. The economic literature on strict liability recognizes that it is,
in fact, a form of insurance—potential tortfeasors subject to strict liability
effectively are required to insure others against harms caused by their conduct. This
Article’s core argument is that pervasive cyber-incident insurance is the best
approach to addressing the full range of cybersecurity concerns.
The characteristics of the model proposed in this Article compare favorably to
the current status quo—one in which users are largely helpless, firms are largely
unknowledgeable, software is generally insecure, federal agencies are generally
impotent to bring about meaningful change, and attackers are largely judgementproof. As an initial matter, it would offer consumers redress when cyber-incidents
occur. But more importantly, it would facilitate education about and monitoring of
cybersecurity practices; it would facilitate the collection, analysis, and use, of
aggregate information about the causes and costs of these incidents; and it would
put that information the hands of parties in a position to improve the existing
ecosystem.
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Cyberensuring Security
JUSTIN (GUS) HURWITZ *
INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is one of the most pressing and legally difficult issues
facing the Internet today. It touches every aspect of modern political and
social life, the economy, and national security. From the breaches of the
Office of Policy & Management (OPM) and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), to the Sony hack, to attacks on hospitals and health insurers, to attacks
on domestic and international infrastructure, to domestic and international
surveillance, cybersecurity concerns are omnipresent. For reasons technical,
legal, and practical, cybersecurity concerns have proven extremely difficult
to address.
In recent years researchers have debated several possible mechanisms
for improving the overall state of the cybersecurity ecosystem. Two of the
most frequently advanced ideas are bringing cybersecurity-related harms

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago,
2007; M.A. (economics), George Mason University, 2010; B.A., St. John’s College, 2003. With
particular thanks to Sasha Romanosky, David Opderbeck, David Thaw, Jay Kesan, participants at the
2017 Connecticut Law Review Annual Symposium, the 2016 GMU Law & Economics Center Digital
Information Policy Scholars Conference, and the 2016 South Carolina Law Review Annual Symposium.
Additional thanks to the staff of the Connecticut Law Review for their excellent work bringing this Article
to print, and to Will Nelson and Kevin Adler for research assistance on this and other projects. This is a
complex and rapidly developing area, so this Article is necessarily incomplete and unquestionably
contains errors—all such infirmities are attributable to myself or APT 29. It is my hope that, despite these
infirmities, this Article advances the discussion about the relationship between cyber insurance and
cybersecurity.
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under a strict-liability regime and use of cyber insurance. Both ideas have
1
See, e.g., Stephen E. Blythe, Contractual Liability of Suppliers of Defective Software: A
Comparison of the Law of the United Kingdom and United States, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 77, 93–94
(2005) (recommending that U.S. contract laws may need to be reformed to “provide additional protection
for the buyer who hurriedly purchases software online without bothering to read an often lengthy
agreement containing legalese”); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Michael Scott, Tort
Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 469–70
(2008) (explaining arguments for and against applying strict tort liability to defective software, and
noting that “[o]ver the last twenty years, there have been calls to impose strict product liability on
software vendors for defects”); Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability
for Defects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH. TECH. L. J. 745,
768–73 (2005) (arguing that strict liability should be imposed on software manufacturers to serve public
policy); see also Jon Evans, Should Software Companies Be Legally Liable for Security Breaches?,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 6, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/06/should-software-companies-belegally-liable-for-security-breaches/ (discussing the inevitability of software liability); Dennis Fisher,
Software Liability is Inevitable, THREATPOST (Aug. 5, 2015, 2:19 PM), https://threatpost.com/softwareliability-is-inevitable/114136/ (“The push for some form of liability for vendors who sell faulty or
insecure software is nearly as old as software itself. . . . the day may soon come when software liability
is a reality.”); Jake Kouns & Joshua Corman, Software Liability? The Worst Possible Idea (Except for
All
Others),
RSA
CONFERENCE
2014,
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/asec-f01-software-liabilitythe_worst-possible-idea-except-for-all-others_final.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2017) (presenting
arguments and counterarguments for software liability); Bruce Schneier, RSA 2012: Are Software
Liability
Laws
Needed?,
SCHNEIER
ON
SEC.
(Mar.
1,
2012),
https://www.schneier.com/news/archives/2012/03/rsa_2012_are_softwar.html (“[L]iability laws [will]
transfer the economic cost for faulty software from the user to the developer and provide an incentive for
the developer to fix the problem.”). See generally David Berke, Products Liability in the Sharing
Economy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 603, 640–48 (2016) (describing the beneficial effects that strict liability
for software would have on the sharing economy); James A. Henderson, Tort vs. Technology:
Accommodating Disruptive Innovation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1145, 1159–60, 1168–70 (2015) (observing
that though disruptive technological innovations are protected by a lack of strict product liability,
products liability law already has procedural safeguards to protect the developers of disruptive
innovations).
2
See, e.g., Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong. 8 (2017) (statement of P.W. Singer, strategist at
New America) (available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170301/105607/HHRG-115AS00-Wstate-SingerP-20170301.pdf []); Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A
Comprehensive Analysis of the Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 33
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 398 (2015) (discussing the rise of cyber insurance); Jay P. Kesan & Carol
Mullins Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity with Cyber Insurance Markets and Better Risk Assessment
(Feb. 27, 2017) (Univ. of Illinois College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-18) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2924854 []) Jay P. Kesan et al., Cyberinsurance as a Market-Based Solution
to the Problem of Cybersecurity—A Case Study 34–35 (Jun. 2, 2005) (paper delivered at Fourth
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security [hereinafter WEIS]) (available at
http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/42.pdf []) (arguing that the cyber insurance industry is evolving and
can inform best practices once a few remaining challenges are worked out); Jay P. Kesan et al., The
Economic Case for Cyberinsurace 30–31 (Univ. of Ill. College of Law, Law and Econ. Working Papers,
Paper No. 2, 2004) (available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=uiu
clwps []); Marc Lelarge & Jean Bolot, Economic Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case
for Insurance 8–9 (Apr. 19, 2009) (paper delivered at 2009 International Conference on Computer
Communications
[hereinafter
IEEE
Infocom.])
(available
at
http://www.di.ens.fr/~lelarge/papiers/2009/infocom09_cr.pdf []) (finding that cyber insurance could
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substantial merit—but they also face substantial obstacles. Perhaps the
greatest criticism of each is the impracticality of implementation, as both
face serious practical and logistical problems. For instance, merely
implementing a strict liability rule doesn’t address a key problem with
current liability regimes: determining damages for cybersecurity-related
harms. Moreover, mandating that firms purchase insurance policies does not
address many insurers’ reluctance to underwrite broad coverage; while the
cyber insurance market has grown dramatically in recent years, it is still
small and policies are written narrowly.
This Article’s key contribution to the issue is the observation that strict
liability and cyber-insurance are complementary sides of a single coin. A
strict-liability regime could make it dramatically easier to overcome the key
challenges facing widespread adoption of cyber insurance policies and a
more vibrant insurance marketplace could help overcome the key challenges
that are preventing the adoption of strict-liability rules for cyber incidents.
This observation offers helpful insights into ongoing discussions about both
strict liability and cyber insurance—insights that are useful to both subject
areas independently, as well as important as a way to bring these discussions
under a common framework.
This Article draws from the economic literatures on strict liability and
insurance to understand their relationship in the cybersecurity context. The
economic literature on strict liability recognizes that it is, in fact, a form of
insurance. Potential tortfeasors subject to strict liability are effectively
required to insure others against harms caused by their conduct.3 Drawing
from that insight, this Article proposes a strict-liability rule for harms
deriving from cyber-incidents. Under this rule, consumer-facing firms that
use or store consumer information would be strictly liable to those
consumers for any security incidents (i.e., data breaches) involving that data.
In order to work, this rule would impose administratively defined statutory
incentivize entities to invest in self-prevention and thereby increase the security of the internet); Parinaz
Naghizadeh & Mingyan Liu, Voluntary Participation in Cyber-Insurance Markets 3–5 (Jun. 23, 2014)
(paper delivered at WEIS 2014) (available at http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2014/papers/Nag
hizadehLiu-WEIS2014.pdf []) (proposing a cyber insurance mechanism); Ranjan Pal et al., Will CyberInsurance Improve Network Security? A Market Analysis 9 (Apr. 27, 2014) (paper delivered at IEEE
Infocom.
2014)
(available
at
http://wwwbcf.usc.edu/~kpsounis/Papers/cyberinsurance_infocom2014.pdf []) (discussing how the potential of
cyber insurance to improve network security is hampered by a need for profitable insurance
mechanisms).
3
See infra Part V.A. (discussing the interplay between strict liability and cyber insurance); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEG. STUDS. 645, 654 (1985)
(discussing how an implicit expectation that liability insurance will be available is built into the rules of
products liability); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1586 (1986) (stating that the initial judicial expansion of third-party liability was motivated by a
desire to protect the poor, and discussing the first adoption of strict liability); Steven Shavell, On Liability
and Insurance, 13 BELL J. OF ECON. 120, 121 (1982) (discussing insurance risk allocation under strict
liability).
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damages, but firms that have cyber insurance policies covering third-party
harms would only pay the lesser of those statutory damages or actual
provable damages for insured claims.
The characteristics of this model compare favorably to the current status
quo—one wherein users are largely helpless, firms are largely
unknowledgeable, software is generally insecure, federal agencies are
generally impotent to bring about meaningful change in the structure and
operation of private markets, and attackers are largely judgement-proof. As
an initial matter, it would offer consumers redress when cyber-incidents
occur. But, more importantly, insurance and insurers play a regulatory role.
They collect and study information about best practices, they train and
educate their customers, they engage with other institutional actors in ways
that can improve the overall quality of the security ecosystem, and they
lobby for legislative and regulatory changes that reduce their exposure to
risk—which, in the security context, means lobbying to reduce overall risk.4
This Article proceeds in five sections. Sections I and II provide an
introduction to the reasons that cybersecurity is challenging. Section I
focuses on why it is hard to secure systems, including technical, institutional,
and economic reasons. Section II builds on this discussion by considering
why it has proven difficult for the law to regulate and improve cybersecurity
practices.
Sections III and IV discuss strict liability and cyberinsurace as potential
ways to overcome the limitations discussed in Section II—approaches that
may improve the overall cybersecurity ecosystem. Both ideas have enough
merit that they have been advanced many times over the years as potential
solutions to cybersecurity challenges. But both also face substantial hurdles
that have limited their viability.
Section V synthesizes the discussion in Sections III and IV. This
synthesis begins with the assertion that strict liability is, from an economic
perspective, a form of insurance. Counterintuitively, strict liability does not
encourage firms or individuals to take greater care to avoid harming parties
to whom they are strictly liable. Rather, the incentive is to invest the same
amount in avoiding harms as one would under an ordinary negligence rule.
Should a harm nonetheless occur, the strictly liable party bears the burden
of compensating the harmed party—that is, it insures the harmed party
against that risk. This suggests—and this Article argues—that imposing
strict liability on firms hosting consumer data would achieve the key
purposes of cyber insurance that have so far remained elusive, and it would
do so in a way that addresses some of the key challenges generally facing
the use of strict liability to address cybersecurity issues.

4
See infra Section IV.B (discussing the regulatory role and functions of insurance and insurers in
the security ecosystem).
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I. THE CHALLENGE
Computer security, especially for Internet-connected devices, presents
hard problems. This Section offers a brief overview of the technical,
practical, and some legal difficulties of protecting data in the online
environment.
The discussion offered below—both in this Section and throughout this
Article—frames “cybersecurity” primarily in terms of data security and data
breaches. It is important for any reader new to cybersecurity to understand
that these are only two subsets of the cybersecurity field, even though many
of the highest-profile cybersecurity incidents involve data breaches. And for
those more familiar with the field, it is important to define the scope of this
Article’s discussion as focusing on the data-breach context. The policy
framework developed in Section V, in particular, focuses on the data-breach
context—or, more precisely, on the relationship between consumers and
consumer-facing firms that store consumer data. At the same time, the
benefits of this proposal would almost certainly redound to the broader
cybersecurity ecosystem.
A. The Ex Ante Cybersecurity Challenge
The basic task of cybersecurity would seem simple: to ensure that those,
and only those, authorized to access data or computers systems are allowed
to do so.5 The difficulties of accomplishing this easily stated task, however,
are myriad. We can begin with just scoping the elements of the task: we need
a way to specify who does and does not have access to a secured system, a
way to identify those users, and a way to specify and control the level of
access they may have. This problem quickly decomposes into requirements
to specify and authenticate individual users, specify the various resources
they may be able to access, and specify various levels of access each user is
granted to each resource.6 The number of combinations of users, resources,
and permitted access levels permutes quickly, imposing substantial costs
(mostly in the form of managing a complex system) both on those managing
and those using the secured system.
Indeed, this complexity is one of the fundamental tradeoffs in the world
of security: allow for finer-grained control—which increases complexity,
imposes higher burdens on those subject to the security model, and increases
5
Critically, the task of “security” is fundamentally different from that of “privacy.” Security is
about prohibiting unauthorized parties from accessing or using data or systems; privacy is about
prohibiting authorized parties from exceeding the use of data to which they have been given access. See
Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 669 (2013)
(discussing the distinctions between privacy and security).
6
See, e.g., Carl Landwehr, Formal Models for Computer Security, 13 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS
247, 250 (1981) (discussing the greatly heightened security complexities of electronic versus paper
documents).
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the likelihood that mistakes in implementing that model will be made,
leading to security faults—or reduce the complexity of the system—which
requires either allowing some users greater access to secured resources than
is necessary or denying some trustworthy users access to resources of which
they would otherwise be able to make beneficial uses.7 By analogy, imagine
designing an office building with a lock on every door, each requiring a
unique key, and providing employees with individual keys to each room to
which they are allowed access. Obviously, no office would actually operate
in this way, because the burdens on both the office management and
individual employees would be prohibitive. This analogy also demonstrates
another of the fundamental tradeoffs in designing secure systems: if the cost
of complying with security protocols is too great, users may find ways to
bypass those protocols.8 This too is most easily seen by example: in the
physical world, one may prop doors open instead of continually unlocking
them; in the world of computers, users may leave passwords written on postit notes, or use the same password for all of their online activity.9
The challenge created by complexity is much more problematic in the
case of computer security than in the physical world. This is because every
aspect of computer security needs to be implemented in computer code.
There are two basic reasons why this is difficult. First, it requires every
aspect of the security protocols to be completely specified ex ante, and,
7
See, e.g., Alexander DeWitt & Jasna Kuljis, Is Usable Security an Oxymoron?, 13 ACM
INTERACTIONS 41, 43 (2006) (indicating that increased sophistication of cybersecurity programs leads to
increased opportunities for user error).
8
See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, THINKING SECURITY: STOPPING NEXT YEAR’S HACKERS 248–49
(2016) (discussing the tendency of employees and systems users to ignore or workaround intrusive
security measures).
9
One of the basic truths of security is that users are one of, if not the primary, security
vulnerabilities. Substantial attention has been focused on studying user behavior and the relationship
between system design and user behavior. Despite these efforts, designing systems that encourage
security aligned user behavior continues to be a central challenge. See generally, Anne Adams & Martina
Angela Sasse, Users Are Not the Enemy, 42 COMMS. OF THE ACM 40 (1999); Elissa M. Redmiles et al,
How I Learned to be Secure: a Census-Representative Survey of Security Advice Sources and Behavior,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY 666 (2016); Ryan West, The Psychology of Security: Why Do Good Users Make Bad
Decisions?, 51 COMMS. OF THE ACM 34 (2008); Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, What the Public
Knows
About
Cybersecurity,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
22,
2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/22/what-the-public-knows-about-cybersecurity/ []; Marc van
Zadelhoff, The Biggest Cybersecurity Threats Are Inside Your Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 19,
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/09/the-biggest-cybersecurity-threats-are-inside-your-company []; Cormac
Herley, So Long, and No Thanks for the Externalities: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users
(Sept. 2009) (paper delivered at the 2009 New Security Paradigms Workshop); Ruogu Kang et al, “My
Data Just Goes Everywhere:” User Mental Models of the Internet and Implications for Privacy and
Security (July 2015) (paper delivered at SOUPS 2015 Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security)
(available at https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2015/soups15-paper-kang.pdf []);
Alma Whitten & J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (Aug. 1999)
(paper
delivered
at
the
8th
USENIX
Security
Symposium)
(available
at
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec99/full_papers/whitten/whitten_html/index.html []).
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second, these security protocols must be specified (in computer code)
accurately. Again taking the physical world as a counter-example: one need
not “program” a door to allow the fire department access in the event of an
emergency (either humans will intervene and, smelling smoke, allow
entrance, or the door will be forcibly opened); one need not “program”
employees to comply with a court order or warrant; and individual actors
can accommodate many otherwise incompletely specified actions on an adhoc basis. For example, an employee could make photocopies for a
contractor who does not have a copier code.10 In the computer context, each
of these actions would need to be specified ex ante—otherwise the system
may need to be taken offline and reprogrammed, or circumvented on a caseby-case (and likely complex) basis. Of course, one can imagine
implementing computer-based security protocols in a way that allows for
greater human discretion (e.g., a bank teller could review every onlinetransaction a user makes, or a system administrator could confirm a user’s
credentials each time she logs into a system). But doing so would defeat one
of the basic purposes of computer-based interactions: removing humans
from routinized transactions so that those transactions can proceed at
computer-scale, not human-scale, speeds.
The problem of accurate implementation is even more substantial than
that of complete implementation. Indeed, one of the foundational theorems
in computer science—the so-called “halting problem”—states that it is
effectively impossible to prove that any computer code beyond a trivial level
of complexity operates as intended (that is, that it contains no bugs, such as
those that could render a security protocol ineffective).11 We need not delve
into the mathematical proofs that show the near impossibility of proving that
a given piece of computer code is defect-free. Rather, we can point to some
of the canonical examples of basic implementations mistakes in securityrelated software.12 Examples include the Heartbleed bug,13 bugs in the
10
Or, to take a canonical example from the literature, see Andrew Odlyzko, Cryptographic
Abundance and Pervasive Computing, U. OF MINN. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CTR.,
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/crypto.abundance.txt (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (“A key problem
with strong information security in an office environment is that it would stop secretaries from forging
their bosses' signatures. A good assistant exercises judgement and handles routine matters without
increasing the load on the boss.”).
11
Mark C. Chu-Carroll, Basics: The Halting Problem, SCI. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://scienceblogs.com/goodmath/2007/02/06/basics-the-halting-problem/ [].
12
See Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems Fail, 1 ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY
215, 218–21 (1993) (detailing common implementations mistakes and corresponding security
vulnerabilities in ATM operating systems); Bruce Schneier, Security Pitfalls in Cryptography, 6 INFO.
MGMT. & COMPUTER SECURITY 133, 134–35 (1998) (discussing basic implementations mistakes and the
security vulnerabilities they expose).
13
See The Heartbleed Bug, CODENOMICON, http://heartbleed.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2017)
(describing the Heartbleed Bug, “a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software
library”).
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Apache TLS implementation,
attacks on encryption Certificate
15
16
Authorities, the Shellshock bug, and critical encryption flaws in Apple
iMessage17 and LastPass.18 Each of these is an example of code developed
and scrutinized, often for years, by sophisticated, security-conscious
programmers that nonetheless contained critical flaws in how they were
implemented.19 In other words, at a technical level security is hard—very
hard—to do correctly.
B. The ex post Cybersecurity Challenge
The issues discussed above relate to the challenges of designing and
implementing a system that is secure—that is, a system that prevents
unauthorized activity. But this is only one part of the cybersecurity
challenge. Because no system is completely secure, any sound security
design needs to anticipate and respond to security breaches. Incident
response presents its own slate of problems, including technical challenges
similar to those that make designing and implementing secure systems
difficult, physical-world problems relating to coordinating human resources
to respond to incidents, and legal challenges.
The gold-standard for approaching security is the NIST Cybersecurity
14
See David Adrian et al., Weak Diffie-Hellman and the Logjam Attack, WEAKDH,
http://weakdh.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (describing a flaw in the TLS Internet protocol that can be
exploited by a Logjam attack, allowing the attacker to read and modify data being passed over a secure
connection).
15
See BLACK TULIP: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DIGINOTAR CERTIFICATE
AUTHORITY
BREACH,
FOX-IT
59
(2012),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2012/08/13/black-tulipupdate/black-tulip-update.pdf (reporting on a MITM attack on the Diginotar Certificate Authority,
whereby the intruder was able to issue rogue certificates granting access to virtually any common
software).
16
See Symantec Security Response, Shellshock: All You Need to Know about the Bash Bug
Vulnerability,
SYMANTEC
OFFICIAL
BLOG
(Sept.
25,
2014),
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shellshock-all-you-need-know-about-bash-bug-vulnerability
(advising on a vulnerability in Bash, a widely used Linux command language interpreter).
17
See Ellen Nakashima, Johns Hopkins Researchers Poke a Hole in Apple’s Encryption, WASH.
POST (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/johns-hopkinsresearchers-discovered-encryption-flaw-in-apples-imessage/2016/03/20/a323f9a0-eca7-11e5-a6f321ccdbc5f74e_story.html?utm_term=.d7e1e6cb42fe [https://perma.cc/EP5E-EB2Z] (reporting on a
vulnerability in Apple iMessage that allowed attackers to retrieve a photo from Apple’s servers).
18
See Joe Siegrist, LastPass Security Notice, LASTPASS (July 10, 2015, 8:00 PM),
https://blog.lastpass.com/2015/06/lastpass-security-notice.html/ (discussing a recent security breach).
19
As another class of examples, consider cases in which elite security professionals themselves
suffer security incidents. See, e.g., Swati Khandelwal, Phone-Hacking Cellebrite Got Hacked; 900GB of
Data Stolen, HACKER NEWS (Jan. 12, 2017), http://thehackernews.com/2017/01/mobile-hackingcellebrite.html (stating that a company that sells hacking tools was hacked); J.M. Porup, How Hacking
Team
Got
Hacked,
ARSTECHNICA
(Apr.
19,
2016,
9:36
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/04/how-hacking-team-got-hacked-phineas-phisher/
(detailing
how an experienced hacker suffered a hack on his own system).
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Framework. At the most general level, this framework defines five core
security functions that must be part of an organization’s cybersecurity
activity. These functions start with identifying the “systems, assets, data, and
capabilities” that need to be secured. Systems then need to be developed to
protect these resources. Recognizing that no system is ever entirely secure,
the next function of the framework is to put in place systems to detect the
occurrence of cybersecurity events. When such an event is detected, the next
step is to respond to it: for instance, by activating pre-established incident
response plans, containing the scope of the event’s impacts, and taking steps
to mitigate its impacts. Finally, once the incident is contained and its causes
corrected, an organization’s final function is to recover from the incident by
restoring backups, reinitializing systems, and the like. Critically, the
framework is process-oriented. Each of these steps is an ongoing process,
subject to ongoing improvement and refinement on its own and as lessons
are learned from each of the other steps.
Detection is likely the hardest of these functions to implement. Systems
need to be designed to allow for the detection of security breaches. Here, as
above, the task of programming computers for this task is far more difficult
than analogous physical-world challenges. To start, secured systems need to
have monitoring capabilities that can observe and record how they are used.
This is an onerous, and at times intractable, task. Adding such capabilities
can substantially reduce system performance, such that any monitoring
instrument needs to be deployed sparsely. We also face the same challenge
of implementing it correctly. Attackers therefore already have two attack
vectors: attack resources that are either unmonitored or ineffectively
monitored. What is more, it is frequently the case that an attacker who
breaches a secured system simultaneously (or as a result of the breach)
obtains access to the system’s monitoring capabilities. Generally, avoiding
this conundrum requires implementing additional separate monitoring and
logging systems (that is, computers)—but this has the unfortunate
consequence of increasing overall system complexity even further, which
can actually make it easier for breaches to occur.
One function of well-implemented monitoring tools is to detect security
incidents in real time. But monitoring also serves the important function of
recording system activity for later use and analysis. The simplest aspect of
this is allowing for the reconstruction of incidents. Reconstruction serves at
least three important purposes: to figure out how an attack occurred so that
future attacks can be prevented, to understand the effects of the attack (e.g.,
to see what data was compromised), and to serve as evidence for identifying
and taking action against those responsible for the attack.
20
The discussion below is modeled around the structure developed in the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 7 (2014) (stating the core elements of the framework as: identify,
protect, detect, respond, and recover).
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But there is another equally important purpose behind monitoring:
establishing a baseline of normal system operation. Unfortunately, data is
rarely analyzed for these purposes. This is one of the reasons that the second
part of the monitoring equation is rarely satisfactorily met: the ultimate
purpose of monitoring a system is to detect abnormal behavior.
The seemingly key function of detecting attacks is often the most
challenging to accomplish. In most computer security breaches investigated
by security consulting firms, the attackers breach a system several months
before their breach is detected. In this time, they may be engaged in
malicious activity (such as exfiltrating information, or manipulating internal
information to harm an attack target), or they may be using their initial
breach as a beachhead to further penetrate the target’s systems.
Once a breach has been detected, incident response becomes the order
of the day. The first step in incident response is to mitigate any ongoing
effects of the breach. For instance, compromised systems should be
disconnected from any networks, sensitive accounts should be locked down,
and appropriate resources should be engaged (e.g., law enforcement or
security professionals). Here too, proper response can be both technical and
difficult. For instance, one of the most important things to not do upon
discovering a compromised system is to turn the system off—even though
this is the intuitive response. Turning the system off will delete potentially
important information stored in the computer’s memory and terminate any
active programs which could be used to figure out the source and scope of
the attack. In addition, turning a system back on can overwrite similarly
important information.
Once the effects of the incident have been mitigated, the compromised
party can turn to responding to the attack. This may include any number of
efforts. For instance, a compromised system should be repaired, and the
source or cause of the compromise fixed to prevent future incidents. Parties
harmed by an attack should generally be notified, both as a matter of best
practices and often as a function of relevant law. Compromised data or
systems may need to be replaced or repaired. The victims of an attack may
want to work with law enforcement, insurers, or vendors to identify or take
action against the attackers. The victims of an attack may also want or need
to take legal action of their own (e.g., to bring a civil suit against their
attackers, if possible, or to defend themselves against suits brought by the
government or as a class action). Discussion of the viability, practicalities,
and limitations of such legal action are the subject of Section II.
C. The Multiplicity of Actors
The technical difficulties of designing secure computer systems are
dramatically compounded by the sheer number of actors in the security
ecosystem. It is useful to identify these actors here, before discussing how

2017]

CYBERENSURING SECURITY

1507

their (often conflicting) incentives further complicate computer security.21
On one far side of the web, we have “users”—those who actually use a
(possibly) secure system. Even this basic unit of the ecosystem is more
complicated than one would expect. Users can refer to the consumer endusers of a piece of software, such as Microsoft Windows. In a firm, users
may refer to the employees of the firm who use software purchased or
designed by the firm. The firm itself may be said to be the user of software
purchased for use by its employees, or even of software that it designed (or
bespoke software designed by a contractor). And, of course, the firm’s
customers are users of services offered by the firm, which may or may not
rely upon systems designed or implemented by third parties.
Those third parties may be firms such as Microsoft, Apple, Google, or
ExamSoft. They could also be vendors that sell turnkey solutions, designed
by themselves or by others. They may be contractors, who design bespoke
systems. Or they may be “integrators,” who integrate various platforms
designed by third parties with a firm’s own systems. Connecting all of these
systems are various Internet-based entities. These include the ISPs that
connect firms to the Internet, or a firm’s customers to the firm’s servers and
services. It also includes cloud-based services, which often host information.
All of these relationships quickly explode into a complex network of
relationships and dependencies—or, in more legalistic terms, reliance
interests, duties, and potential liabilities. Consider a firm storing its
customers’ information on a cloud-storage service that it integrated into its
back-end systems (running Microsoft Windows) using proprietary software
written by a contractor that relies on the application program interface (API)
provided by both Microsoft and the cloud provider. If the proprietary
software leaks the customers’ confidential information due to a previously
unknown problem with how Microsoft’s API interacts with the cloud
provider’s API, who is liable?
Now let’s add into this mix cyber-physical systems and Internet of
Things devices: your modern, Internet-connected car, with literally hundreds
of networks and computers running a range of software—including locationaware software that automatically turns your home’s heating system to
energy-saving mode when you leave the house and unlocks your front door
when you return. Some of the software running on your car’s computers is
commercial software, some of it was developed internally by the car
manufacturer’s own software development team, and some of it is “open21
In addition to the discussion presented below, see, e.g., Johannes M. Bauer & Michael J.G. van
Eeten, Cybersecurity: Stakeholder Incentives, Externalities, and Policy Options, 33 TELECOM POL’Y
706, 708 (2009) (“Information and communication services require inputs from many players. They
include internet service providers (ISPs), application and service providers (App/Svc), hardware and
software vendors, users, security providers, and national and international organizations involved in the
governance of these activities.”); Susan Tisdale, Cybersecurity: Challenges From a Systems, Complexity,
Knowledge Management and Business Intelligence Perspective, 16 ISSUES INFO. SYSTEMS 191, 192–93
(2015) (detailing the need for cooperation and exchange between stakeholders).
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source software” that has been developed over the years by an army of
hundreds or thousands of anonymous volunteers whose commitment to the
quality of the software only runs as deep as their possibly transient interest
in working on open-source projects as a way to learn the basics of computer
programming.
This multiplicity of actors makes establishing cybersecurity
responsibility difficult. Each of the actors has some legitimate argument that
at least some of the others bear responsibility for almost any cyber-incident.
Software was poorly designed or integrated, systems were improperly
implemented or managed by firms or their contractors, ISPs should have
detected harmful activity by malicious actors and informed their targets or
cut off access, firms failed to train or monitor their employees, employees
failed to comply with established procedure, customers chose to work with
unknown firms that had unknown or poor security practices, or firms failed
to have satisfactory security practices. The response to any security incident
will invariably be to assign blame to any number of other parties.
It is notable that responsibility for security breaches is rarely
meaningfully attributed to the parties that are actually responsible: the
attackers behind the cyber-incident.22 This is a nod to the practical reality
that it is often impossible to identify the attackers, that it would typically be
almost impossible to bring suit against the attackers if it were possible to
identify them, and that even then, a victim would be unlikely to recover
meaningful damages from them. Amazingly enough (and as discussed in
Section II), even if the victim could find the attacker, given the challenges
discussed throughout this Section, it would be very difficult to establish the
elements required to be awarded damages against him. Given the
multiplicity of actors and difficulties of designing secure systems, it can be
difficult, if not impossible, to establish causation and (especially) harm. As
a result, it often makes more sense to seek legal recourse against one of the
many intermediary actors, even when they were not in a meaningful position
to prevent a given harm. This is the canonical case of the data breach, where
damages (when they are sought) are almost always sought against the firm
that experienced the data breach and are almost never sought against the
actual parties that caused the breach (either as attackers or for having
designed or implemented insecure systems).
On a final note, it is useful to discuss briefly the multiplicity of harms
that may result from a cyber-incident—or, stated alternatively, the
22
On the topic of attribution, see JEFFREY HUNKER ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE
PROT., ROLE AND CHALLENGES FOR SUFFICIENT CYBER-ATTACK ATTRIBUTION 5 (2008) (defining
attribution and the difficulties associated with it); Jon R. Lindsay, Tipping the Scales: The Attribution
Problem and the Feasibility of Deterrence against Cyberattack, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY 53, 54 (2015)
(stating that attribution is particularly difficult because attackers depend on deception to obfuscate their
identities).
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multiplicity of motivations that attackers may have. Starting with the most
apparent motivations that attackers may have: they may seek to obtain
information through hacking. This could be information about a firm’s
customers (e.g., passwords, personal information, correspondence, creditcard information), or about the firm itself (as in the case of espionage). They
may also intend to damage a firm, for instance by altering or deleting
sensitive information or damaging physical systems controlled by
compromised computers. Attackers may use “ransomware” to demand
money from a target. The compromised systems may in fact not even be an
intended target: they could be a platform that attackers use in attacking other
third-party systems. Or attackers may have political or social purposes: they
may intend to embarrass a firm or individuals, to cause reputational damage,
or to advance a political agenda.
This range of motivations further demonstrates the challenges discussed
thus far. For instance, if one expects attackers to target sensitive customer
information, it may be possible to address this risk by minimizing the
amount of customer information that is stored and encrypting what
information must be kept. It is more difficult, however, to prevent control
systems from being used to damage the systems that they control—to do so
would undermine the purpose of having computerized control systems. This
also demonstrates what will be an important challenge discussed in detail
below: establishing harm for the purposes of liability. How should a court
measure the harm caused by an attack that shuts down a firm for a few hours,
or results in the disclosure of (truthful) information about a firm’s customers,
or that is the basis forcing the firm to adopt a new policy as part of a political
agenda? Courts are generally reluctant to award damages for harms such as
these—they are simply too speculative and difficult to measure.
D. The Multiplicity of (Conflicting) Incentives
Each of the myriad actors in the cybersecurity ecosystem faces their own
incentives in deciding how or whether to respond to security concerns.24
While each would likely benefit from an improved cybersecurity ecosystem,
none has strong incentives to invest substantially in such benefits. And
23
See David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 916
(2013) (stating that hackers hack for financial gains); see also Robin Gandhi et al., Dimensions of CyberAttacks: Cultural, Social, Economic, and Political, 30 IEEE TECH & SOC’Y MAG. 28, 29 (2011) (“It is
also now known that cyber-attackers’ level of socio-technological sophistication, their backgrounds, and
their motivations, are essential components to predicting, preventing, and tracing cyber-attacks.”).
24
See Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, Information Security: Where Computer Science, Economics
and Psychology Meet, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF ROYAL SOC’Y 2717, (2009) (discussing the various
factors to consider when deciding whether to respond to security concerns, such as economic
considerations).
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many, in fact, have incentives to adopt bad security practices.
One of the most basic—and pernicious—causes of problematic
incentives in cybersecurity is externalities.25 Externalities exist where the
private costs or benefits that accrue to one party as a result of a given act do
not incorporate the costs or benefits that befall third parties. The gap between
first- and third-party effects is called an externality.26 The canonical example
is that of air pollution: it has often been the case that factories were free to
use the air as a free resource, polluting it without regard to how that pollution
affected third parties. Because the owner of the factory does not bear the
harmful effects of air pollution she will over-use the air, creating negative
third-party effects that would not occur if these costs were borne by the
factory owner.27 Unfortunately, given the multiplicity of actors in the
cybersecurity ecosystem, cybersecurity is characterized by pervasive
externalities.28
Another important set of incentives echoes the fundamental tradeoffs
between security and usability described in Section I.A. Both users and those
designing software and other computer systems are generally willing to
forego security for greater usability and performance. This results in large
part from the difficulty of holding designers liable for defective software—
the threat of legal liability would of course be a powerful incentive for firms
to improve their products’ security. This is further exacerbated by firms’
ability to attribute fault for security incidents to others in the security
ecosystem—including attributing fault to users themselves. This reduces
firms’ ability (or need) to compete along a security dimension—especially
when consumers are often more responsive to the usability and short-term
cost dimensions. And there is reason to argue that users do, in fact, bear
some responsibility for the poor state of the cybersecurity ecosystem: despite
professed fears about the collection and use of sensitive data and widespread
concern about cybersecurity, consumers very readily engage in conduct
online that exposes them to risks.29 This is surely, in some part, a reflection
of putatively irrational decision making by consumers. It is also, to some
extent, a form of rational ignorance: consumers are not security experts, nor
do they have the time or knowledge necessary to evaluate most firms’
25

See Anderson & Moore, supra note 24; see also Bauer & van Eeten, supra note 21, at 710 (“Many
of the challenges of reaching an optimal level of information security at the aggregate level are rooted in
a potential mismatch between the perceived individual and social benefits and costs of security.”); Nathan
Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 N.W. U. L. REV. 1503 (2013).
26
Sales, supra note 25, at 1519–20.
27
For further discussion of this concept, see Sales, supra note 25; Bauer & van Eeten, supra note
21, for concise discussions.
28
Bauer & van Eeten, supra note 21, at 707 (explaining that, while private actors face many
incentives to improve security, “significant externalities remain that cannot easily be overcome by private
action”).
29
See, e.g., Kenneth Olmstead, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/ (“[M]any Americans are failing
to follow digital security best practices in their own personal lives . . . .”).
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security practices, and they reasonably believe that the law will protect them
should they be harmed by malfeasant firms. Thus, it is reasonable for
consumers to engage in what appears to ordinary users to be ordinary online
activities.
Similarly, firms that make use of third-party security systems in their
broader business—that is, the vast majority of firms—face poor security
incentives. Most security incidents target firms’ customers’ information,
such that the firms themselves are unlikely to experience any loss from an
attack—that is unless news of the attack becomes public, in which case a
firm may face substantial reputational harms and may also bear some direct
costs from responding to the attack. In other words, the incentive for most
firms is to invest in very basic security—only enough to secure their systems
from casual attackers—and otherwise pay no attention to security. These
incentives were arguably even worse before the recent, and relatively
widespread, adoption of state data-breach notification laws30—laws that
require firms to notify affected consumers of data breaches that may affect
their (the consumers’) data. Before the adoption of such laws, firms often
faced no incentive to disclose or even to respond to a data breach, and were
incentivized to keep the fact of the breach secret. But even following
adoption of these laws, firms still do not face substantial incentives to adopt
strong security practices. This is in part because there is still little likelihood
that a firm will be held liable for damages resulting from a data breach. More
tragically, this is also largely because consumers have become inured to data
breaches, such that the reputational harm to a firm of a data breach is much
less today than it was even two or three years ago.
Perhaps the worst incentives are faced by the cybersecurity industry
itself. Estimates vary, but the size of the cybersecurity “market”—
comprising firms that specialize in various aspects of cybersecurity, from
systems design, to consulting, incident response, and litigation—is currently
pegged at somewhere around $75-100 billion.31 This amount is expected to
grow to $170 billion by 2020,32 a growth rate significantly exceeding that of
other parts of the economy. In other words, the status quo is working well
and industry participants have little reason to improve the state of the
cybersecurity ecosystem.33
30

See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (Feb. 24, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx (providing an overview of the state laws).
31
Steve Morgan, Worldwide Cybersecurity Market Continues Its Upward Trend, CSO (July 9,
2015,
5:47
AM),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2946017/security-leadership/worldwidecybersecurity-market-sizing-and-projections.html [].
32
Id.
33
For one colorful discussion of this reality, see Iain Thompson, GCHQ Cyber-Chief Slams Security
Outfits Peddling “Medieval Witchcraft,” REGISTER (Feb. 3, 2017, 7:03 AM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/03/security_threat_solutions/ (stating that the cybersecurity
community is opposed to spreading unfounded fear and uncertainty in an effort to sell products).
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II. PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS
Section I discussed why cybersecurity is difficult as a technical and
practical matter. This Section looks at the difficulties of using the law to
address cybersecurity concerns. It starts by considering the relationship
between legal and technical institutions. It then considers the challenges that
private law institutions have faced in responding to cybersecurity incidents,
followed by consideration of the efficacy to date of public law institutions.
A. Law and Technology as Complementary Approaches to Cybersecurity
As discussed in Section I, there are many reasons why cybersecurity is
a legitimately difficult problem. It is technologically difficult to specify what
is required of a secure system, it is extremely difficult to accurately
implement the system once specified, and it is effectively impossible to
verify that such a system is implemented correctly. Moreover, the costs of
security in terms of design, implementation, performance, and user
experience are substantial enough that they are often not justified by their
benefits. This is particularly problematic when we consider the private
incentives faced by almost every actor in the security ecosystem: almost no
actor has strong incentives that are in line with best security practices, and
almost every actor has strong incentives that run contrary to best security
practices.
None of these problems, however, are new. Many systems and
institutions are difficult to design or implement properly. Indeed, it is a basic
fact of life that mistakes and accidents happen, and that people are often
harmed by those mistakes. Moreover, it is often the case that individuals’
private incentives do not align with socially optimal conduct. Cybersecurity
presents extreme cases of all of these problems.
Society manages to continue moving along despite these challenges
largely because the law operates as a backstop that mitigates the harms that
may result from them. The law steps in when things go wrong. In general, it
does so through two mechanisms. First, it compensates parties that are
harmed by bad actors or bad actions. In other words, it assures users of a
system that if they are acting reasonably and are harmed by another actor
who is acting unreasonably, they can be compensated for that harm. Second,
it makes clear that parties who cause harm to occur are liable for that harm.
This in turn creates incentives for those who create systems used by others
to do so carefully—to design their systems so that they will not cause undue
harm—because they will be responsible for compensating others for those
harms.
Law and technology are complementary approaches to the design of
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well-designed systems. We want systems to be well designed ex ante so as
to limit harms. The availability of ex post remedies ensures that those
designing systems will be held to account for their design decisions. At the
same time, the law recognizes that risk is inevitable and mistakes may
happen. So the law generally works to assign liability for harms in ways that
maximize the social value of activity, mitigating concerns that individual
actors will be motivated solely by their private incentives at the expense of
imposing costs on society.
But this synergy between law and technology assumes the presence of
effectively designed and implemented legal rules. As suggested in Section
I, the legal rules relating to cybersecurity have proven wholly ineffective.
This has had the unfortunate consequence of exacerbating cybersecurity
problems—as described in Section I, many actors in the cybersecurity
ecosystem not only lack incentives to act well, but have incentives to act
badly. These incentive mismatches result largely from the lack of effective
legal rules.
The rest of this Section discusses the failings of current legal approaches
to addressing cybersecurity concerns. This will provide a foundation for the
discussion in Sections III and IV, presenting an alternative approach to these
concerns.
B. Private Law Approaches to Cybersecurity
“Private law” refers broadly to legal causes of action that individuals are
able to bring against one another. For instance, suits for trespass, breach of
contract, or negligence are traditional private law causes of action. So too
would be a civil cause of action created by statute that can be initiated by
individuals, or a class action brought by a group of individuals. This is in
contrast to “public law” causes of action, which are generally those initiated
by the government. These include, for instance, criminal prosecutions,
enforcement actions brought by regulatory agencies, rules created by federal
agencies with which regulated parties must comply, and various forms of
informal regulation exercised by government actors to channel the conduct
of private parties.
Private law institutions have proven largely ineffective at addressing
cybersecurity concerns for much the same reason that cybersecurity is itself
difficult. In order to successfully bring a civil lawsuit, one needs to be able
to demonstrate various things, such as the identity of the actors that caused
34
The canonical contemporary discussion of this is offered by Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence
Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUDS. 661, 672 (1998) (“The aim of the New Chicago
School is to speak comprehensively about these tools—about how they function together, about how they
interact, and about how law might affect their influence. These alternative constraints beyond law do not
exist independent of the law; they are in part the product of the law.”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
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a harm; that they, in fact, did cause that harm; that the harm is legally
cognizable; and that there is some adequate measure of damages. Each of
these elements is difficult in the context of cybersecurity. The multiplicity
of actors in the security ecosystem and the complexity of the interactions
between them makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to attribute fault
to any specific actor.35 And even when fault can be attributed to a single
actor, there are likely other confounding factors (or actors) that make it
difficult to prove that the actor’s conduct was a proximate cause of the
specific harm.36 For instance, a firm that failed to safeguard its customers’
information may argue that the software it was using was defective, that the
vendor hired to install and maintain its software failed to do so correctly,
that an auditing firm it hired to ensure its systems were properly secured
failed to detect the relevant faults, that its network providers failed to detect
or alert it to suspicious activity, or even that the customers were
contributorily negligent in providing their data to an untrustworthy party.
Even if the harmed party can demonstrate that a specific actor’s conduct
was improper and proximately caused an adverse security incident, courts
have struggled with the concept of “harm” online—both in terms of
recognizing that the subject of the cyber-incident has in fact experienced
harm and in assessing the extent of that harm for purposes of damages.37 The
canonical example here is the disclosure or theft of personal information. In
one canonical case, for instance, courts found that an airline’s disclosure of
passenger information to the federal government’s antiterrorism efforts was
35
See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Braches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the
Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 938 (2016) (“When everything is connected, a breach at
one node of the network potentially affects all nodes, or a multiplicity of nodes, in unpredictable, nonlinear ways. Can tort law play any principled role in managing this risk?”).
36
This is most often seen in the context of the economic loss doctrine. See id. at 968–69 (“There is
no ‘stream’ of causality, but rather a non-linear ‘web’ of causes and effects, running backward and
forward, up and down, in and out, under and around. In one sense, this should make the duty/proximate
cause/economic loss analysis easier: outside the immediate ‘proximity’ of the breach, determining the
probability of loss with any reasonable certainty might prove impossible. In another sense, however, the
difficulty of showing which affected parties are ‘upstream’ and which are ‘downstream’ of something
like the Michigan Avenue Bridge could mean that tort law cannot perform its traditional functions of
deterring excessively risky conduct, encouraging risk mitigation strategies, and adjusting the social costs
of externalities.”).
37
For a discussion of the extent of damages resulting from a security incident, see infra note 104
and accompanying text. Courts have struggled in particular with the circumstances under which a firm’s
loss of consumer data in a security incident can satisfy Article III standing requirements. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Green, Note, Standing in the Future, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 287 (2017) (discussing standing in data
breach litigation); Eric S. Boos et al., Damages Theories in Data Breach Litigation, 16 SEDONA CONF.
J. 125 (2015) (same). This analysis was made even more difficult following the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Spokeo v. Robins, in which the Court emphasized the need for harms to “actually exist” and
to be “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract’” in order to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirements. Spokeo v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). Both the intangible nature of many cybersecurity-related harms,
as well as remoteness of the harm from the underlying security incident, can make the “concreteness” of
a given harm an indeterminate inquiry.
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in violation of contractual assurances, but the court held that it did not
represent a cognizable harm to the customers.38 In that case, the court
dismissed the lawsuit because the lack of awardable damages rendered it
moot.39 Similarly, courts have struggled with cases of identity theft or theft
of credit cards, especially where credit monitoring services are provided to
affected customers or banks refund fraudulent charges.40 And even where
courts are willing to recognize that harms are real, the question often turns
back to questions of proximate cause. We live in a world in which
information such as credit-card numbers is stolen with such frequency that
it is difficult for a court to accept that fraudulent charges resulted from any
specific theft of a consumer’s information. It is simply too possible that the
specific harm resulted from some other cyber-incident for the courts to
award damages against a possibly innocent third party without some greater
evidence tying the fraudulent use of credit-card information to a specific
breach. Of course, such evidence is almost certainly impossible to gather.
There is another issue lingering in the background of the discussion so
far. The sort of cases discussed above, in which a firm fails to properly
protect its customers from adverse cyber-incidents, are governed by tort law,
specifically negligence. Other forms of tort claims are similarly
problematic.41 But other issues are governed by contract law. Contract law
is important in the cybersecurity context for two critical reasons. First, courts
have generally upheld the use of contracts, including dense, boilerplate,
consumer-facing contracts that are widely recognized as meaningless to
consumers in the cyber-domain.42 The contracts very often contain waivers
of liability or other forms of indemnification.43 Unfortunately, liability is
typically contractually assigned away from parties that are most likely to be
proven liable, or otherwise limits damages. This further compounds the
problems of determining liability discussed above. Second, contractual
language is often imprecise, a reflection of the complexity inherent in the
cybersecurity ecosystem, which in many cases creates further uncertainty
rather than clarifying responsibility.
Importantly, private law has a relatively simple mechanism for dealing
with many of the difficulties discussed: strict liability. Under some
38

In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 324–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 326–27.
40
See Amy Dunn, Bridging the Gap: How the Injury Requirement in FTC Enforcement Actions
and Article III Standing are Merging in the Data Breach Realm, 20 J. CONSUMER & COMMERCIAL L. 9,
16–18 (2016) (describing the different approaches taken by courts in finding a basis for standing in cases
involving threats of future harm).
41
For example, intentional torts, such as trespass, are problematic because it is very difficult to
identify the attackers, to attribute a specific attack to them, prove causation, demonstrate no contributory
factors that offer the attackers a defense, and demonstrate cognizable, recoverable, damages.
42
Scott, supra note 1, at 456.
43
Id. at 457.
39
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circumstances the law will assign liability to a given party regardless of fault.
The canonical area of strict liability in tort law is products liability where the
manufacturer of a defective product that causes consumer harm is liable for
any harms caused by that product no matter how negligently the consumer
was in its use.44 For example, the manufacturer of a table saw would be liable
for injuries caused to a consumer by a failure of the saw even if the consumer
was using the saw for improper purposes—e.g., while intoxicated, after
damaging the saw, and while wearing a blindfold and standing on crutches.
Or, as another example, someone who chooses to engage in
“ultrahazardous” or otherwise extreme activities like blasting with
dynamite, or keeping dangerous animals like tigers as pets is generally
subject to strict liability.
The underlying policy rationales for strict liability are discussed in
Section III, which argues that cybersecurity should be a strict-liability
regime. For the purposes of the present discussion, we need only say that
courts have declined to treat services or computer software—the primary
components of the cybersecurity ecosystem—as “products.”45 They
therefore have not been treated subject to the rules of strict liability. Rather,
they have been subject to the traditional principles of contract and
negligence.
C. Public Law Approaches to Cybersecurity
There are various public law institutions in the United States that address
cybersecurity issues. While some of these efforts effectively address narrow
problems that effect parts of the cybersecurity ecosystem, there are no
effective public law institutions that address broader problems. In particular,
there are no public law institutions that generally ensure parties harmed by
adverse cyber-incidents can secure recovery for their losses, that alter the
perverse incentives faced by the various actors in the cybersecurity
ecosystem, or that generally improve the overall quality of that ecosystem.
In the United States there is no general law of data security. Rather, there
is a sector-by-sector approach to regulating specific security concerns. There
are, for instance, specific laws and regulations relating to the security of
financial information,46 health information,47 information about students,48
44

Scott, supra note 1, at 457–58.
Id. at 461–62.
46
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102 (1999) (“An Act
To enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the
affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers.”).
47
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191 (1996) (“An Act
To . . . improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage . . . to combat waste, fraud, and
abuse in health insurance and health care delivery . . . and for other purposes.”).
48
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2013) (illustrating how the Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act
(FERPA) controls the release of education records).
45
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and consumer credit information.
By and large, regulatory efforts to improve security such as these are
inoffensive. Without question they draw additional attention and scrutiny to
particularly sensitive areas and provide valuable resource towards the goals
both of educating stakeholders about security concerns, and of taking action
against those who fail to address these concerns. At the same time, we should
be aware of the limitations of these targeted approaches. In almost every
instance, sector-specific regulations are “consumer protection” statutes that
impose controls on what information can be shared or used by those to whom
it has been given. Firms generally implement these requirements by limiting
how information they hold can be accessed by employees, or shared among
their peers or partners. While this has the positive effect of protecting
consumers, it has adverse effects of limiting the use of more efficient
technologies or making more valuable uses of information. For instance,
restrictions on the use and sharing of medical information dramatically
hampers medical research; it is literally the case that some medical
researchers believe such restrictions “threaten[] the social good by seriously
restricting biomedical research and unnecessarily slowing the path toward
life-saving discoveries.”50 Restrictions on financial transactions and
disclosure of student records encourage firms to use outdated systems,
impose burdens on consumers who need to authorize the disclosure or use
of their information, and generally lead industry to make use of stale, but
statutorily clear business practices instead of innovating new ones.
More problematic, because these rules are generally focused on
protecting consumers, they are not focused on improving the overall state of
the cybersecurity ecosystem. As such, they don’t offer a systematic approach
to addressing any of the issues that make cybersecurity difficult. Because
these regulations are industry-specific, but the issues that make
cybersecurity hard are generalized, none of the regulated industries are in a
strong position to effect change to the broader cybersecurity ecosystem.
Rather, each industry develops its own, costly, and largely inefficient (if not
ineffective) means to protecting consumers.
The most direct federal “cybersecurity law” that Congress has adopted
is the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA).51 The purpose
of this law is to immunize private firms from liability for sharing information
relating to cybersecurity incidents with the government and, in some cases,
other private firms.52 Such information sharing is important to improving
49
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (illustrating how within the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) credit
reporting agencies must respect the consumer’s right to privacy).
50
ASS’N OF ACAD. HEALTH CTRS., HIPPA CREATING BARRIERS TO RESEARCH AND DISCOVERY,
1–2 (2008), http://www.aahcdc.org/policy/reddot/AAHC_HIPAA_Creating_Barriers.pdf.
51
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter CISA].
52
Larry Greenemeier, A Quick Guide to the Senate’s Newly Passed Cybersecurity Bill, SCI. AM.
(Oct.
28, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-quick-guide-to-the-senate-s-newlypassed-cybersecurity-bill/.

1518

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1495

cybersecurity, but there has been longstanding concern that firms that share
such information could be subject to liability. CISA makes clear that “no
cause of action [lies] against any private entity … for the monitoring or
information systems and information” or “for the sharing or receipt of any
cyber threat indicators or countermeasures” under the Act, and that “it shall
not be considered a violation of any provision of antitrust laws for two of
more private entities to exchange or provide cyber threat indicators, or
assistance relating to the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of
cybersecurity threats, for cybersecurity purposes under this Act.”53 The
reality of CISA, however, is that it is a very small improvement coming more
than a decade too late to meaningfully improve the cybersecurity ecosystem.
CISA addresses concerns that were pressing in the early 2000s and which
the private sector and federal government have already largely solved in the
intervening years.54 CISA reduces the friction involved with these solutions
and provides firms a level of assurance that they are secure from liability
that they did not have before. But the reality is that CISA was little more
than a vehicle by which Congress could claim to have passed a
“cybersecurity law.”
Beyond CISA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the great
exception to the sector-specific approach to cybersecurity in the United
States. Since the turn of the century, the Commission has been working to
use its general authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts and practices”
under Section 5 of the FTC Act to establish itself as a general regulator of
consumer-facing data security issues.55 The FTC entered the business of
regulating firms’ data security practices largely in response to the failure of
the private law described above. After courts began dismissing lawsuits
because consumers could not establish harm, the FTC stepped in to take
action against firms accused of mishandling consumer data, arguing that
failure to protect consumer data was an unfair (or, if in violation of a firm’s
established security or privacy policy, a deceptive) business practice.
The FTC’s efforts have been controversial, both lauded and criticized
by many. Much of the controversy over the FTC’s efforts relate to its use of
broad and uncertain legal authority to regulate a large portion of the
economy without clear Congressional authority to do so, and in particular its
use of adjudication (as opposed to rulemaking procedures) to develop

53

CISA 6(a), 6(b), 4(e).
For instance, in 2003 DHS established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT) to coordinate information sharing across the federal government and with private sector
actors. Greenemeier, supra note 52.
55
See Justin Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 963–
64 (2016) (citing Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012))).
54
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binding legal norms. What this means is that the Commission has not
provided the industry with any formally issued guidance regarding what
constitutes “good” or “bad” security practices. Rather, it has offered
informal guidance on an occasional, often ad-hoc, basis, which it has sought
to formalize by taking legal action against firms that, in the FTC’s own
estimation, are engaged in bad behavior. Due to the procedures the FTC has
used in approaching this issue, the legality (and constitutionality) of this
approach has not been addressed by the courts—though one case is currently
pending that may lead to such a resolution.57
Regardless of the legality of the FTC’s efforts to regulate data security
practices, there are other reasons these efforts should raise concern. As an
initial matter, the FTC approaches security from a consumer protection
perspective. As such, and as with the sector-specific approaches, its efforts
focus only on the outer border of the cybersecurity challenge. The FTC does
not try, nor does it have statutory power to try, to address the myriad actors
and mixed incentives that make ensuring cybersecurity difficult. It is
possible that the FTC’s approach will, over time, indirectly influence the
incentives of the myriad actors in the broader cybersecurity ecosystem. As
firms become increasingly aware that they may face liability for failure to
protect consumer data, those firms may demand more secure systems from
the rest of the ecosystem. This effect, however, will likely be largely muted
in the case of the FTC’s enforcement actions. As an initial matter, firms may
choose, instead, to adopt clear policies indicating that consumers use their
services at their own risk, or otherwise limit their liability. Indeed, on the
FTC’s own terms its efforts are only meant to hold firms to “reasonable”
security practices, which should arguably be weighed in light of the current
state of the art; these efforts therefore ought not to create any incentives to
change the state of the art on their own.58
56
See id. (discussing the FTC’s reliance on administrative adjudication to develop a law of data
security). For a more favorable take on the FTC’s approach to data security, see Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014);
Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 2230 (2015); Chris Hoofnagle, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
(Cambridge, 2016).
57
See LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270-D, 2016 WL 8116800, at *3 (11th Cir. 2016) (granting
LabMD’s motion for stay of FTC’s order pending appeal). The few judges that have reviewed the case
have implicitly or expressly expressed concern. Hurwitz, supra note 55, at 978.
58
The precise meaning of “reasonable” as the FTC uses it in this context is unclear. In late 2015,
an FTC Administrative Law Judge rejected an FTC complaint arguing that a medical testing laboratory’s
security practices were insufficient under the FTC Act. LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033
(F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (dismissing the initial complaint). In June 2016, the FTC Commissioners
overturned the ALJ opinion, finding that the firm’s security practices were sufficiently lax to lead to a
likelihood of consumer harm. LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. Jul. 28, 2016)
(containing the final order). The case is currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Pending the outcome of this litigation, the Eleventh Circuit has stayed the FTC’s order, suggesting that
the FTC’s interpretation of the required “likeliness” of harm is insufficiently concrete (that is, that the
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Another important problem with the FTC approach to cybersecurity is
that it does not meaningfully inform or educate anyone about good security
practices.59 The primary audience for the FTC’s data security is a small cadre
of data security lawyers and information security professionals who work at
relatively sophisticated, mid-to-large-sized, firms. This further insulates the
effects of the FTC’s efforts from the core cybersecurity challenges. First, to
the extent that it is educating firms about good cybersecurity practices, the
FTC is only communicating to those firms that already understand the
challenges of cybersecurity, and that largely have the internal resources to
address these challenges on their own. But the vast majority of online
activity is undertaken by less sophisticated actors: consumers, small
businesses, and start-ups, who either lack sophisticated understandings of,
or the resources to address, cybersecurity challenges. And, importantly,
these are the same actors who depend on outside resources, the myriad
parties with mixed incentives that permeate the cybersecurity ecosystem, to
educate and protect them.
III. STRICT CYBERLIABILITY
Section II explained that the law, when working well, can create
powerful incentives that align individual conduct with socially-optimal
goals, but that, in the case of cybersecurity, various factors confound the
law’s utility. This Section argues that a transition to strict liability for
cybersecurity related harms would remedy the majority of these concerns,
thereby allowing standard private law institutions to function and bring
about dramatic improvements to the state of the cybersecurity ecosystem. In
addition, this Section offers some suggestions for how to implement such a
transition. Importantly, this is only the first part of this Article’s broader
recommendation. In Section IV I will turn to the desirability of a vibrant
cybersecurity insurance marketplace in anticipation of Section V’s
discussion of the relationship between strict liability and the insurance
marketplace.
A. Defining Strict Liability
The primary private law mechanism that has been used—or attempted,
as described above—to address cybersecurity concerns is negligence. Under
this model, parties are only liable for harms that they cause to others through
FTC interpreted “likely” to mean something equivalent to “merely possible,” but that “likely” likely
requires something more). LabMD, Inc., 2016 WL 8116800 at *1, *3–4.
59
Gus Hurwitz, FTC’s Efforts in LabMD Lack Required Due Process and Don’t Actually Improve
Security, TECH POL’Y DAILY (Aug. 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/technology/ftclabmd-dont-improve-security/; but see Hartzog & Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
Protection, supra note 56.
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their own negligence. In the classic formulation, a party engaging in an
action that causes harm to someone else has acted negligently if the party
failed to take precautions against such harms commensurate with the
reasonably foreseeable likelihood and magnitude of those harms.60 In other
words, we expect people to take at least $50 worth of precaution to avoid a
one in ten chance of causing $500 in harm to others.
The central idea behind the negligence model is that risk is unavoidable.
Parties may be able to invest in mitigating risk, but cannot eliminate the
possibility of risk entirely. If we were to hold parties responsible for any
harm that they may cause to others, we are concerned that parties will overinvest in precaution or avoid risky but socially valuable activity. For
instance, driving is inherently risky—on any given drive there is a chance
that you will get into a costly accident. If we put too high a burden on drivers
to avoid such accidents, they may over-invest in safety or avoid driving. But
by only holding parties responsible for taking reasonable precautions—that
is, those commensurate with foreseeable harms—we do not dissuade any
socially beneficial activities. In other words, modern negligence liability is
designed to ensure that parties engage in the socially optimal level of
activities.
But negligence is not the only approach to assigning liability. Starting
in the 1960s, courts began to impose so-called strict liability in some cases.61
Under a strict-liability regime, a given party is always responsible for the
harm incurred by its counterparties, no matter how careful that party was to
avoid such harm.62 The underlying theory is that one party may be in a better
position to prevent or assess the likelihood of certain harms than the other.
An important situation where this is the case is where assigning liability to
one party allows for risk pooling. For example, parties on one side of a
transaction systematically may not be able to absorb costs, or the expected
costs may be distributed too thinly to justify taking precautions. It is also the
case where one party is in a better informational position than the other, or
is in a better position to gather or disseminate information.
Counterintuitively, as will be considered further in Section V, strict
liability does not affect the level of care that a party will take. One intuitively
expects that if we impose strict liability on a party, that party will take greater
precautions to avoid such harms than if it would only be liable in the event
of its own negligence. This is not the case. Under either model, parties will
60

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s duty,
as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions.”).
61
See infra Section III.C (containing case law regarding strict-liability standards for tort law).
62
See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDS. 151, 168 (1973) (stating
that under strict liability, “a party who has caused a loss must pay damages whether or not he was
negligent”); Shavell, supra note 3, at 127–28 (discussing coverage and premiums related to liability
insurance).
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only invest in avoiding harms up to the point that the cost of such investment
is commensurate with the expected magnitude and likelihood of harm. In
other words, it never makes sense to spend $75 to mitigate a one in ten
chance of causing $500 in harm. Rather, under strict liability, one will spend
$50 in precaution and simply pay the balance of $450 if that $500 in harm
happens to occur. The key difference between negligence and strict liability
is how the $450 loss that results when the harm does occur. Both negligence
and strict liability accept that bad things happen and that no amount of
precaution can prevent every risk. In fact, we do not want people to invest
in inefficient levels of precaution. The difference between the two systems
is that in a negligence regime, the harmed party bears the cost of the harm.
Contrastingly, in a strict-liability regime, it is borne by the other party. While
the strict liability model may seem grossly unfair, we will see in Section IV
that it turns out to function much like an insurance system and that it can be
a very positive model in some circumstances.
B. No Strict Cyberliability Today?
At this juncture, the point must be clearly made that software and
computer systems historically have not been subject to strict liability and,
absent statutory intervention, are not likely to be made subject to strict
liability. In the modern tort setting, strict liability applies almost exclusively
in the context of products liability. Over the past several decades, courts
have struggled to fit computer software within the ambit of products
liability. They have struggled to determine whether software is a “product”;
they have struggled over whether inadvertent software errors rise to the level
of defective design; and they have struggled with whether software released
without sufficient testing to avoid errors is defectively manufactured.63
Indeed, because software is generally not viewed as a “product,” and
because it is generally licensed under copyright law, courts have generally
found any contractual and license terms pertaining to the sale or license of
software to be enforceable—and these terms almost always include
disclaimers and waivers of liability.64
Even if we view software as a product and software defects as design or
manufacturing defects, there are still challenges to applying strict liability
for software. For instance, we still face difficulties in establishing damages

63

See Scott, supra note 1, at 430–35 (discussing whether software is a product).
See Jennifer Chandler, Information Security, Contract and Liability, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841,
843 (2010) (“Yet, the purchasers of software are usually contractually bound by end user license
agreements . . . which contain generic disclaimers about fitness, functionality, or quality, as well as
exclusions of liability exempting the vendors from any problems that arise from defects.”).
64
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and recovery may be limited by the economic loss doctrine. And an even
greater challenge to bringing a “strict” products liability claim is that courts
have increasingly embraced what is known as the risk-utility test to
determine products liability.66 Under this approach, products liability takes
on a very negligence-like characteristic.67 Given the near impossibility of
designing defect-free software, many commentators believe that it will be
exceptionally difficult to successfully bring a products liability claim.68
Over the years, there have been frequent calls for the application of strict
products liability principles to computer software.69 Nonetheless, the status
quo today is that defective software today is only subject to liability under
principles of ordinary negligence, if at all.70
C. Cybersecurity is a Classic Case for Strict Liability
Despite the discussion above, cybersecurity presents a near textbook
case for strict liability. The policy rationales for strict liability—the
challenges that strict liability evolved to address—match the challenges
created by cybersecurity. Indeed, even the historical challenges that gave
rise to modern strict liability map onto the issues faced today in the
cybersecurity setting. And while there are a number of common concerns
about strict liability—concerns that militate against its use in various settings
—they are largely inapposite to the cybersecurity setting. The discussion
below turns away from the application of the legal rules that surround strict
liability today and focuses instead on the historical development of the
doctrine and the economic understanding of how it functions.

65
See Opderbeck, supra note 35, at 982 (“The suggestion that data breach tort claims should not be
barred by the economic loss doctrine does not affect the issue of the need to prove ascertainable losses
in order to have Article III standing.”).
66
See Scott, supra note 1, at 467–68 (defining the risk-utility test).
67
Id. at 467.
68
See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transaction, 38 DUQ. L. REV.
459, 508 (2000) (“To argue that a software publisher is obligated to disclose all ‘defects’ in a program
begs the enormously difficult issue of defining just what a software ‘defect’ is, let alone the computational
difficulties of determining what every defect might be.”); Daniel Garrie, The Legal Status of Software,
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 711, 736 n. 167 (2005) (“One major impediment to the
application of strict liability is the widely held belief that it is virtually impossible to guarantee that
software is error-free”); Sheldon Childers, Note, Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for
Embedded Software, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 172 (2008) (“If it is impossible for the average
developer who relies on these ever-changing tools and technologies, through reasonable effort, to
completely eliminate defects from software, it follows that embedded software is to some extent
unavoidably unsafe. … As applied to software, strict products liability would attempt to compel a result
over which the software engineer lacks control.”).
69
Scott, supra note 1, at 467. Perhaps the most poignant, and prescient, of these calls, was made by
Danielle Citron in Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 1.
70
See supra Section II.B.
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1. The Origins of Strict Liability
The origins of modern strict liability in the American legal tradition are
generally traced to Judge Cardozo’s famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company,71 which eliminated the privity requirements for suits
brought in tort.72 Prior to MacPherson, individuals could only bring suit
against those with whom they shared some direct connection (that is, with
whom they had privity). In other words, if a driver were injured in an
automobile accident caused when a component of her car failed, she could
only sue the person who sold her the car—she could not sue either the car
manufacturer or a third-party manufacturer of the component that failed (for
instance, if the component that failed had been bought by the manufacturer
and integrated into the final component, as is often the case with many
automotive components, such as tires). All of these parties only have an
indirect relationship with the driver, so are said to lack privity. Under the
pre-MacPherson model, the driver would be expected to sue to person who
sold her the car and that person could then countersue other third parties,
either under separate legal theories or seeking indemnification.
MacPherson changed all of this, opening the door to direct suits by
drivers (or other end-users) against manufacturers (or other responsible
parties in the supply chain). The underlying rationales were intended to
address the same sort of challenges that we see in the cybersecurity context.
The multiplicity of parties in a supply chain make it difficult to figure out
who to sue and make it difficult to establish or apportion liability. In both
the case of MacPherson and the modern cybersecurity setting, this
effectively externalizes risk onto consumers, and creates perverse incentives
for how the various entities through the relevant product ecosystems design
their products and services.
MacPherson was only the first step towards the modern understanding
of strict liability. While it allowed parties to bring suits in the absence of
privity, those suits were still brought under a negligence standard. Starting
in the 1960s, some courts began developing the modern understanding of
strict liability in cases involving consumers harmed by (arguably)
defectively designed or manufactured products. The canonical case is
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,73 which involved a wonderfully
monstrous power tool sold by Yuba, the “Shopsmith, a combination power
tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe.”74 Mr. Greenman was
injured a year or so after his wife purchased Shopsmith for him as a
71

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
See id. at 1053 (“We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.”).
73
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
74
Id. at 898.
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Christmas present, and brought suit for breach of warranty and negligence.75
The trial court determined that the manufacturer had not been negligent, and
that Mr. Greenman’s harms were not covered by any express or implied
warranty.76
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California found the manufacturer
strictly liable for Mr. Greenman’s injuries, explaining that the question of
“liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort.”77 As explained by the court, “[a] manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being.78 “The purpose of such liability is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”79 Critically, under a strict
liability model, parties are not free to assign risk of harm by contract—any
contract or warranty attempting to do so is a legal nullity.
2. Strict Liability and Negligence
Strict liability is an exception to the ordinary rule of negligence—it is
only used in certain cases. The traditional examples are products liability,
such as was the case in Greenman, and so-called ultrahazardous activities,
such as keeping dangerous animals as pets or the use of explosives.80 It is
clear why we only turn to strict liability in cases like these—and why
cybersecurity is a similar case—when we look to the core policy rationale
underlying strict liability: ensuring that liability for harms be assigned to
parties best able to bear it. Both negligence and strict liability accept that
some amount of harm naturally occurs in the world. Under a negligence
model, we assume that parties bear, and are able to bear, comparable
responsibility for preventing or accepting the risk of harm. Under strict
liability, we assume that the parties—especially in their abilities to prevent
or accept risk—are asymmetric. In terms of preventing risk, we are generally
concerned about risks that would be unreasonably, or impossibly, costly for
individuals to detect. For instance, if a consumer could not determine
whether a saw blade contained manufacturing defects without engaging in
75

Id.
Id. at 898–99.
77
Id. at 901.
78
Id. at 900.
79
Id. at 901.
80
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”); id. at § 520
cmt. g (“If the potential harm is sufficiently great, however, as in the case of a nuclear explosion, the
likelihood that it will take place may be comparatively slight and yet the activity be regarded as
abnormally dangerous.”).
76
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destructive testing of the blade, the law may hold the blade’s manufacturer
strictly liable for manufacturing defects. Similarly with ultrahazardous
activities, where it is unreasonable, for instance, to expect individuals to take
precautions against the use of explosives in construction operations or pet
tigers that may be roaming the streets, we place a strict burden on the party
engaging in the atypical activity. We see the same in terms of accepting risk.
In this case, the concern relates to the parties’ relative abilities to bear the
costs of a risk should harm come to pass. Again, the example of an injury
related to power tools is illustrative: such an injury could be physically or
economically devastating to an ordinary consumer, and many consumers do
not have the knowledge or wherewithal to insure against such losses. The
manufacturer, on the other hand, is in a much better position to assess the
possible risks, and to insure consumers against those risks.
This rationale for strict scrutiny is not without criticism or nuance. Many
of the criticisms of, and concerns raised by, strict-liability regimes will be
considered shortly below—and the idea that strict liability acts as a form of
insurance will be considered in greater depth in Section V.
3. Strict Liability and Cybersecurity
Before considering these issues, we can outline the case for applying
strict liability in the cybersecurity context. We already saw that the rationale
for the first steps towards strict liability—MacPherson’s abandonment of
privity requirements81—mirrored concerns similar to those we see in the
cybersecurity context: the difficulty of attributing liability and recovering
damages that results from the multiplicity of actors and the complexity of
their interconnected relationships. So, too, do the concerns about parties’
relative abilities to prevent and accept risk motivate modern principles of
strict liability mirror reality of the cybersecurity setting. As discussed in
Section I, every entity engaged in conduct online—from individuals, to
small businesses, to non-profit and governmental organizations, to large
non-tech firms, to large tech firms—is exposed to cybersecurity risks.
Mitigating these risks is far beyond the expertise of the vast majority of these
entities. And, even if it were not beyond their expertise, most defects in thirdparty systems are latent. Even if these third parties open their systems up for
inspection, it is functionally impossible to expect even sophisticated parties
to audit them for defects at reasonable costs.
This is largely descriptive of the situation that exists in the business-tobusiness landscape. Even among sophisticated parties, few are in a position
to meaningfully understand, let alone prevent, cybersecurity risks. But this
is even more dramatically the case in the consumer-to-business relationship.
Here, consumers are almost entirely at the mercy of the firms they interact
with online to keep data that they disclose to those firms secure. Consumers
81
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have no visibility into those firms’ systems, into what data those firms retain,
how they manage that data or use it, or to whom it is disclosed (intentionally
or unintentionally). Once their data has been shared with a firm, consumers
have literally no ability to monitor its subsequent use or handling, to take
precautions to prevent harm, to detect its misuse, or to take action in
response to those harms.
Indeed, the cybersecurity context arguably presents a more “textbook
case” for the use of strict liability than seen in most “textbook cases.” Strictliability regimes have two basic effects: they increase the price of products
and services and they encourage risk-taking by consumers. They increase
the cost faced by providers of products and services because those providers
bear the risk of any liability. But these costs are almost always passed on to
consumers. The net effect, discussed in more detail in Section IV, is that
firms subject to strict liability act as insurers: they spread the cost of risk
across the entire pool of consumers, collecting a premium for that risk
through the price they charge, and they use those premiums to pay out
damages as they occur on a stochastic basis. Importantly, the concern about
increasing prices has an important, potentially pernicious, secondary effect:
more price sensitive consumers, or those who are less exposed to risk, may
select themselves out of the market. This has the effect of spreading the cost
of risk across smaller pool of consumers, each of whom therefore has to pay
proportionally more. Taken to the extreme, this can make some products
unviable in the market—as was indeed observed in the 1980s.82 In proposing
a strict-liability regime, we need to be very cautious about this concern, as it
could be devastating to the market. The second concern is similarly
important: if consumers are aware (implicitly or explicitly) that another
party is liable for any harm that befalls them, consumers may have an
incentive to opportunistically engage in riskier behavior. For instance,
consumers may shirk on routine maintenance of potentially dangerous
products, or fail to read manuals or otherwise educate themselves to the safe
operation of potentially dangerous products, if they know that they will
receive compensation despite their own negligence.
4. Challenges of Strict Liability
There are two well-understood problems raised by strict liability:
adverse selection and moral hazard.83 Fortunately, neither of these concerns
is substantial in the cybersecurity context. Users and purchasers of products
and services throughout the cyber-domain consistently have little ability to
control, monitor, or prevent against harm. At the retail level, consumers are
82

Priest, supra note 3, at 1521.
See James R. Garven, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability, 28 J. INS. ISSUES 1,
4, 6–7 (2005) (explaining the effect of compensation from moral hazard and adverse selection); see also
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238–40, 285 (1996) (further
defining moral hazard in comparison to adverse selection).
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wholly at the mercy of the firms with which they work and to which they
provide data to ensure that that data is reasonably stored, used, and secured.
The best that even a sophisticated consumer can do is rely on a firm’s
assurances and reputation. But if the past several years have demonstrated
anything about security, it is that even security-conscious, sophisticated
firms can be the subject of cyber-incidents. The same also holds in the
business-to-business context. When one firm engages another to provide
security related services or products, it is generally because the contracting
firm lacks the sophistication or resources to implement those products or
services on its own. And, as discussed at the beginning of this Article, the
complexity of software and of designing secure systems, means that
contracting parties cannot reasonably audit or monitor the performance of
most security-related products or services.
Taken together, this analysis means that neither of the common concerns
about strict-liability regimes apply in this context. A transition to strict
liability likely will increase the cost of providing products or services,
especially in the short run, but not in a way that is likely to adversely affect
consumers. The risk of harm from cyber-incidents is spread relatively
uniformly across the online ecosystem, which means that we are not worried
about price increases causing some portion of the market to opt out of the
market (leading to further increases in price to the remaining portion).
Indeed, the opposite is more likely to occur: concerns about security today
increase the cost of participating in these markets today, which may cause
risk-averse users to opt out of the market (or to engage in costly and largely
ineffective self-help, such as using complex password management systems
or multiple e-mail addresses). Pushing the cost of these risks back to the
parties best able to mitigate and bear them could actually grow the market,
rather than segmenting it. And, in the long run, placing the risk of cyberincidents on parties that are better able to mitigate them will likely lead to
an overall improvement in the systems that make up the cybersecurity
ecosystem, reducing the overall risk for everyone. Similarly, the second
concern about strict liability—that, in this context, it creates perverse
incentives for users and contracting parties to engage in riskier behavior—
is largely inapposite. Today, it is hard to imagine an environment in which
participants routinely engage in riskier behavior.
The basic problem in the security ecosystem as it exists today is that the
difficulty of imposing liability in negligence and contract models has
effectively created a “strict fault” regime. Under this current regime—which
is governed by negligence and contract law in name only—sophisticated
parties pervasively externalize risk upon unsophisticated parties. This is
exactly the opposite of how the law usually works, and of how we should
want to see incentives structured: we generally want to impose liability in
the first instance on the parties best able to prevent harm from occurring or
to absorb the risk of harms that do come to pass. Doing so tends to reduce
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overall risk to society by maximizing incentives to efficiently reduce it and
minimizing the costs to those dealing with it. Under a negligence and
contract model, we have seen the opposite: incentives to burden
unsophisticated parties with risk rather than working to mitigate it, without
any concern for the cost of the resulting harms. Strict liability is manifestly
a better approach.
D. Limitations: Statutory Damages, Other Practicalities, and Best Laid
Plans
Transitioning to a strict-liability regime would address many of the
problems facing today’s cybersecurity ecosystem—an argument taken up in
Section V. But strict liability is not a panacea. Before turning to discussing
the relationship between strict liability and insurance, some practicalities of
implementing a strict-liability regime for cyber-incidents need to be
considered.
The substantial limitation on a strict-liability regime is that it does
nothing to address the question of damages. Recall that one of the greatest
obstacles to imposing civil liability on firms that have experienced data
breaches, or other cyber-incidents, has been proving cognizable harm in
court. Courts have consistently found that damages cannot be awarded in
these cases because causation is too tenuous, there are too many potential
intervening factors that could have caused any harm, or harm is too
speculative to quantify.84
There is a straightforward solution to this problem: statutorily directed
damages. “Statutorily directed” means two things. First, courts should be
instructed to err on the side of finding cognizable damages. Evidence still
needs to be required to support a finding of damages, but courts can be
statutorily directed to require a reduced burden of proof, shift the burden of
proof, or accept that certain harms (e.g., privacy harm) are cognizable.
Second, and more important, Congress can direct the establishment of a
schedule of damages to be used by courts in establishing damages for
various sorts of harms at trial. The FTC, for instance, could be directed to
establish such a schedule of damages through a rule-making process, with
instruction that the schedule be based on empirical data but that the agency
should err on the side of finding substantial damages and that deference
should be given to the agency in interpreting that data. Indeed, it may make
sense to require the agency to use a multiplier in setting damages. Once such
a schedule of damages had been set, courts would use it as a floor in the civil
context—a judge could still find higher actual damages or assess punitive
damages where appropriate—and would otherwise fall back on the statutory
direction to find cognizable damages in the event of harms not covered in
84
See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Opderbeck, supra note 35 (discussing various
challenges that face cybersecurity related litigation, focusing on the economic loss doctrine).
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the schedule.
There is also a question of who would be subject to strict liability in the
cybersecurity context, given the multiplicity of actors in the ecosystem. The
policy rationale for applying a strict liability rule do not apply across all of
the relationships in this ecosystem. At one extreme, system vendors and
integrators and their clients are often sophisticated parties engaging in
negotiated commercial contracts. There is little reason that these parties
should be subject to anything other than the contractually negotiated terms
of their contracts. On the other extreme, as discussed above,85 consumerfacing firms providing services to and collecting information from
consumers present a near-classic case in which strict liability is
appropriate.86 Any cybersecurity related strict liability rule should be
designed to apply only to those firms where principles of ordinary
negligence or contract law do not sufficiently protect parties from security
related risks.
Beyond the question of damages, there are other implementation details
and decisions that would need to be addressed. A few specific points are
discussed below, with the goal of designing a system that is broadly
incentive aligned—though it is certainly not the only approach, and there
certainly are other issues that may need to be addressed. One challenge that
the switch to strict liability does not address is the incentive that firms face
to detect, disclose, and otherwise respond to adverse cyber-incidents. Simply
stated, under any liability regime a firm will face no liability if it can keep
an incident secret. As an initial matter, a federal civil cause of action should
be created alongside the transition to strict liability that allows both private
parties (acting alone or as a class) and the FTC to bring civil actions in
federal court. The low bar to recovery created by the strict liability nature of
this cause of action, along with the multiplier to be used by the FTC (or other
agency) in developing a schedule of damages, creates an initial incentive for
those potentially harmed by cyber-incidents to be vigilant in monitoring and
taking action in response to them. Additionally, punitive damages should be
expressly authorized—even encouraged—for firms that do not timely detect
or respond to a cyber-incident. On the other hand, firms should be
affirmatively encouraged to put procedures in place for the timely detection
of and response to cyber-incidents—including providing notice and
reasonable compensation to harmed parties. One simple approach to creating
such an incentive is to bar suits by the FTC or class actions against firms
that have such procedures in place.
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See supra Section III.C.
Similarly, firms that collect or aggregate consumer information without any direct involvement
from consumers also present a strong case for strict liability. See supra Section III.C.3.
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IV. CYBERINSURING LIABILITY
Section III of this Article argued the merits of using strict liability to
address harms that result from cyber incidents. Use of strict liability in this
context would correct many of the challenges that parties face in establishing
liability for harmful conduct discussed in Section II. In particular, the
failures of existing private and public law mechanisms to assign liability for
cyber-incidents creates incentives for those who would otherwise bear the
cost of mitigating or the costs of harms caused by such incidents—generally
the same parties who are in the best position to take precautions against
them—to externalize the risk of cyber-incidents on to third parties—
generally those least able to mitigate or afford to bear such risk. In effect,
the current model is a no-(third-party)-liability model, which creates
pervasive, harmful incentives. Adopting a strict liability model would go far
to align public and private incentives to reduce cyber-incident risks to a more
efficient level.
It turns out that there is a nexus between strict liability and the sort of
insurance that would improve the state of cybersecurity. Academics have
been discussing the value of cyber insurance as a mechanism for improving
the overall state of cybersecurity for over a decade, but in more recent years
have lamented the insurance marketplace’s failure thus far to realize this
possibility.87 Indeed, while the cyber-insurance marketplace has grown
substantially in recent years, the policies that are being written are largely
structured in ways that limit the broader impact of insurance on the state of
cybersecurity. In order to improve the quality of cybersecurity, insurance
needs to provide more complete coverage—in particular, insurers (and,
through them, the rest of the ecosystem) need to internalize the risks that are
systematically externalized due to the diffuse nature of the cybersecurity
ecosystem. It turns out that strict liability, in economic terms, actually is a
form of insurance, and as a form of insurance it is particularly sensitive to
these externalized third-party effects.
This relationship between strict liability and insurance, and potential
effects on cybersecurity, is discussed in Section V. Before turning to that
discussion, this Section provides a background discussion of insurance
generally and of cyber insurance in particular. It starts by providing a general
overview of what insurance is, its potential applicability in the cybersecurity
context, and its limitations.

87
See, e.g., Kesan & Mullins Hayes, supra note 2 (noting that only about a third of U.S. firms carry
cyber-insurance policies and that commercial general liability policies often exclude, and carriers litigate
to narrow coverage of, losses related cyber-incidents); Singer, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that cyber
insurance “is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall scale of the insurance industry . . . the scale of
our digital economy, and the scale of cybersecurity risk . . . .”).
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A. Defining Insurance
1. Risk Pooling
Insurance is tool for pooling risk.88 It allows parties that face predictable
but uncertain risks to reduce the variance in costs that they face as a result
of the risks. It is driving by the statistical “law of large numbers,” which tells
us that if we take a large number of parties that face similar risks, on average
each party will incur the average costs of these risks. In other words, if 100
parties face a 10% chance of a $1,000 loss and a 90% chance of a $0 loss,
each of those parties will experience an average loss of $100.
Without insurance, a party subject to this risk will either incur no loss or
a $1,000 loss—it will never incur the average, $100 loss. Such a party is said
to self-insure: it will face a $1,000 liability should the risk of loss materialize
and so must be in a position to pay out that much. Such a party is also said
to face a large variance in expected outcomes: it will pay out either $0 or
$1,000.
With insurance, the insured party will pay an insurer the average
expected loss amount ($100, plus some administrative fee to cover the
insurer’s costs). Should the risk materialize, the insurer will pay out $1,000;
should it not materialize, the insurer keeps the $100. A party buying such an
insurance policy faces small variance: it knows that it will pay exactly $100
in all circumstances. This provides the insured with predictable and stable
flow of costs.
Insurance does not necessarily reduce or eliminate risk. Rather, it
transfers it from the insured party to the insurer. By pooling risk from a large
number of insureds, insurers are in a better position to absorb the costs of
risk. When a risk materializes into an actual liability, the costs on a selfinsuring party can be substantial. This is immediately intuitive to most
people: the sudden imposition of tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars
that can result from even a non-catastrophic car accident could easily
bankrupt most drivers. But, thanks to the law of large numbers, an insurer
who insures a sufficiently large number of parties can anticipate and manage
its cash flow to accommodate such losses.
2. The Actuarial Process: First- and Third-Party Insurance
The heart of the insurance businesses is the actuarial and underwriting
process. This is the process by which insurers identify and estimate the likely
costs of the risks that a party wants to insure against. For instance, a driver
will provide insurers with demographic information, information about her
car and driving record, her driving patterns, and the like. A successful insurer
will accurately estimate these risks and their associated costs and charge its
insureds a concomitant amount.
88
THE WORLD BANK & GAVI ALLIANCE, BRIEF 4: RISK-POOLING MECHANISMS 1, 4 (2010),
http://apps.who.int/immunization_financing/tools/Brief_4_Risk-Pooling.pdf [].
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On the other side of this process, the party seeking insurance needs to
identify what risks it wants to insure against. There are a number of standard
risks for which we use insurance: automobiles, unemployment, health care,
loss or damage to houses or businesses, and the like. In principle, insurers
are generally willing to sell insurance against any risk, provided that they
can reasonably estimate the likely risks and costs of loss—though, in cases
of indeterminate or particularly costly, likely losses, premiums for such
policies can be substantial.
A particularly important distinction in types of insurable risks is that
between first-party and third-party liabilities. Most insurance is first-party,
meaning that when the insured party experiences a loss, insurance
compensates it for those losses. In third party insurance, the party purchasing
the insurance is doing so to insure a third-party against loss. For instance, a
firm seeking to do business that may cause risk to third parties may agree to
purchase insurance to insure those parties against that risk—sometimes even
without those third-parties’ knowledge.
3. Insurance as Regulation
Most insurers are not passive entities. They make money by reducing
the actual rate of loss compared to the actuarially anticipated rate of loss.
There are a number of ways that this can be accomplished. A primary
function of the underwriting process is not only to assess the actuarial risks
of a potential insured, but to educate and instruct the insured on how to
reduce those risks. In some cases, this is an entirely passive process. For
instance, an automobile insurer is likely to indicate to potential customers
that there are discounts for drivers of cars with airbags, anti-lock brakes, or
other safety devices; and drivers who have completed driving safety courses
are also likely to pay lower premiums. The primary purpose of these
discounts is to determine a driver’s actuarial risk—but by announcing them,
drivers are also educated about ways to reduce their risk. In other cases, this
process is more active. For instance, a business seeking insurance against
theft is likely to go through a more intensive underwriting process that will
involve an actual inspection or in-depth checklist of the business’s security
practices and that will identify egregious risks (and likely insist that they be
addressed prospectively) and will include express directive guidance on best
practices.
In other cases, insurers may attempt to improve actuarial risks for all of
their actual or prospective clients—instead of focusing on individual
customers in the underwriting process. Perhaps the best example of this is
the lawsuits filed by automobile insurers in the 1980s to challenge the
decision by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
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to stop requiring cars to come standard with seat belts. Of course, insurers
do not do this out of the goodness of their hearts; they do so because it is
likely to increase their profitability. This is particularly likely to be the case
where the use of insurance is required (expressly or implicitly) by law, where
parties subject to the insured risk are unlikely to appreciate the potential
costs of the risk, or where the actuarial costs of insurance are high enough
to push a significant number of firms out of the market. As we will see
below, all three of these are likely to be the case with cyber insurance.
B. The Virtues of Cyber-insurance
Insurance can have a broad regulatory effect on a market, improving
both the conduct of those using insurance and the overall state of a given
market. Insurers have unique abilities and incentives to inform firms of their
legal obligations, to develop best-practices, to audit and educate firms as to
those practices, and to lobby for improvements to the overall state of the
cybersecurity ecosystem. For this reason, widespread adoption of cyber
insurance would potentially spur dramatic improvements in quality of the
cybersecurity ecosystem.
Section I of this Article made the case that, stated simply, cybersecurity
is hard. Participants throughout the cybersecurity ecosystem have
surprisingly little understanding of the pervasive risks and challenges
associated with cybersecurity, let alone an understanding of best (or even
merely good) practices. At the user level, individuals rarely have familiarity
with principles of security “hygiene,” as it is referred to in the literature—
concepts like how to identify and respond to risks, how to manage
passwords, e-mail accounts, and other sensitive information, and with whom
to share or not share information. Going up a level in the food chain, small
businesses frequently lack all of this knowledge as well but are also tasked
with bigger, more complicated challenges: how to design and secure basic
IT systems, how to monitor, identify, mitigate, and respond to cyberincidents, how to design and implement an incident response plan. For most
small- and even mid-sized businesses, it is enough of a challenge (and
expense) just to get a basic IT infrastructure in place. Especially outside of
the tech sector, most firms don’t even know what issues they face, let alone
how to address them. The same basic story can be told at nearly every level
of participation and sophistication in the cybersecurity ecosystem; even
those who are implementing systems often lack information about the needs
and sophistication of their customers, making it difficult to design systems
that promote good security hygiene.
89
See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1412, 1423 (2013) (discussing the factors that affect claims
in lawsuits, like “airbag and seatbelt regulation”).
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Insurance—and insurers—are uniquely situated to address these systemand ecosystem-level concerns.90 The basic business of insurance is the
collection of data relating to risk, the quantification of that risk, the
evaluation of individual insureds’ risk profiles, and the minimization of both
their insureds’ exposure to and the overall market’s creation of risk.91
An insurer’s first job is to build its actuarial tables—to collect data that
will allow it to evaluate an individual insured’s exposure to risk in a given
industry. This is a process that, in the context of cybersecurity, we will return
to in Section V.
Once an insurer has a sense of the factors that go into determining an
individual insured’s exposure to risk, it can begin underwriting new clients.
This is the process by which insurers evaluate possible clients’ risk profiles
to determine their insurability and the premiums to be charged for insurance.
In the cybersecurity context, for instance, an insurer is likely to conduct an
audit of a firm’s systems and procedures: what is the architecture of the
firm’s network, what data is stored and used, how is access controlled, what
incident response plans are in place, how are employees trained and
monitored, how is third-party access to the firm’s systems (e.g., by
contractors) assigned and monitored, and the like. This process alone
offers—or would offer—most firms a more in-depth evaluation of their
cybersecurity systems than they would ever otherwise receive, except
possibly in the case of a serious security incident. Even more important, it
would offer these firms the most in-depth education regarding security bestpractices that they are likely to ever receive. Moreover, insurers have an
incentive to monitor their insured’s ongoing performance, providing
ongoing updates and training regarding best practices and responses to
newly discovered security problems
It is difficult to imagine a more effective approach to educating and
evaluating the bottommost layers of the security pyramid. And this leads to
a second powerful benefit of widespread adoption of cyber-insurance
policies, effective push-back against the pervasive externalization of risks
from sophisticated parties onto unsophisticated parties. There are two
sources of this push-back. First, as consumers and firms are informed by
insurers about their exposure to risk, they will have greater demand for more
secure products. This means both that they will be willing to pay more for
more secure products (which would lower their insurance premiums), and
they will put greater pressure on vendors and service providers to provide
90

For some of the best treatments on the role that insurers can play as regulators, see Omri BenShahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 197 (2012); and Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005). See generally supra note 2.
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(2010),
http://www.iiminfo.org/CONSUMERS/HowInsuranceWorks (discussing the procedures of how
insurance is priced, sold, and purchased).
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more secure products and services. And second, the insurance industry itself
will serve as a powerful lobby to push for better designed and more secure
products and services. The software and tech industries are powerful
interests that have largely been successful in shielding themselves from
liability for the quality of their wares—for good reasons and bad. There is
no concerted interest group on the other side of this balance—consumers are
too diffuse a group with too little an understanding of the relevant harms to
which they are exposed to effectively lobby against Silicon Valley or the
Business Software Alliance to demand risk be shifted back to those who
have built the insecure infrastructure on which we have come to depend.
C. Limitations of
Externalities

Cyber-insurance:

Damages,

Data,

Exposure,

Despite the positive story about cyber insurance told above, the reality
of the cyber-insurance market is less rosy. The cyber-insurance market faces
a number of challenges. While it has been growing at a substantial pace in
recent years, it is still “just a drop in the bucket” compared to the scale of
the cybersecurity problem.92 As recently noted by Peter Singer, less than half
of Fortune 500 firms have cyber insurance; 18,000 mid-size firms do not
have cyber insurance; and only 5% of manufacturing firms have cyber
insurance.93 Overall, only about a third of US firms carry cyber insurance
policies.94
In recent years, academics have extensively studied the incentives that
insurers have to offer cyber insurance.95 The particular focus of these studies
has been to determine whether insurers are likely to offer policies that will
improve the overall quality of the cybersecurity ecosystem. The general
conclusion has been that they do not.96 Except in the case of a monopoly
92

Singer, supra note 2, at 7.
Id.
94
Kesan, supra note 2.
95
See, e.g., Podolak, supra note 2, at 399 (discussing the types of coverage insurers may offer);
Christian Biener et al., Insurability of Cyber Risk: An Empirical Analysis, 40 J. GENEVA PAP. RISK INSUR.
ISSUES PRACT. 131, 148 (2015) (discussing factors that insurers consider before offering cyber
insurance); Lelarge & Bolot, supra note 2 (analyzing the risks and rewards that insurers face in offering
cyber insurance); Naghizadeh & Liu, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing how cyber insurance can often lead
weaker network security); Pal et al., supra note 2, at 9 (noting that, although an insurer is not guaranteed
to make a profit by offering cyber insurance, there is substantial societal benefit to having a cyber
insurance market).
96
See Naghizadeh & Liu, supra note 2, at 2 (“The literature on cyber-insurance has mainly focused
on one of the two market environments of competitive or monopolistic insurers. On one hand, it can be
shown that in competitive insurance markets, the introduction of insurance contracts not only fails to
improve, but can further worsen network security relative to a no-insurance scenario. . . . On the other
hand, it is shown that by engaging in premium discrimination, a monopolistic profit-neutral cyber-insurer
can induce socially optimal security investments . . . . although [these solutions] implement the socially
optimal solution . . . participation is assumed to be mandatory, e.g., users are enforced through policy
mandates to purchase insurance.”).
93
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insurance provider or mandatory insurance, models of the insurance industry
predict that insurers will limit the policies that they offer to first-party
contracts that only insure firms against their direct losses in the event of a
cyber-incident.97 Indeed, the literature predicts that such policies can worsen
the overall cybersecurity ecosystem by reducing firms’ incentives to take
precautions to avoid third-party harms that could result from compromise of
their systems.98
The cyber-insurance market has, in fact, proceeded along these lines.
Insurers are generally willing to underwrite first-party policies that protect
firms against the direct costs that they incur from a security incident—costs
that include investigating and recovering from a cyber-incident, and
business losses associated with that incident.99 And, for that matter, insurers
are also happy to underwrite third-party risks.100
Although insurers are increasingly underwriting these policies, their
breadth of coverage remains substantially unclear. Many of the terms, both
in Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies that offer cyber-incident
coverage and standalone cyber-insurance policies, remain untested in
court.101 Tellingly, “the ratio of premiums to the coverage limit for cyber
insurance is triple the ratio of other liability policies and six times higher
than the ratio for property insurance”102—a circumstance that both speaks to
the uncertainty in the scope of these policies’ coverage and that likely makes
these policies unattractive to many potential insureds.
What is more, and unsurprisingly, insurers are pushing against broad
interpretation of their policies’ coverage—or, conversely, for broad
construction of these policies’ exclusions—at every turn.103 This is, of
97
See id. at 3 (discussing how the optimal insurance contract, for insurers, consists only of a
premium and a coverage level).
98
Id. at 2 (“[T]he introduction of insurance contracts not only fails to improve, but can further
worsen network security relative to a no-insurance scenario.”).
99
Podolak, supra note 2, at 374.
100
For a comprehensive treatment of both first- and third-party cyber insurance underwriting, see
Romanosky, et al, Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How do Carriers Develop Policies and
Price Cyber Risk? (draft on file with author).
101
See, e.g., Lorraine Armenti and Steven Cantarutti, The Evolution of Cyber Coverage Law: A
Survey of Critical Decisions and the Market’s Response, ABA Litigation Committee (Nov 21, 2016)
(available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation-committees/insurancecoverage/articles/2016/fall2016-cyber-coverage.html []); Jeff Sistrunk, The State of Cyber Coverage
Law: 4 Key Decisions, LAW360 (April 9, 2016 8:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/786246/thestate-of-cyber-coverage-law-4-key-decisions (discussing several recent cases); Kesan, supra note 2
(conducting a broad empirical study of cyber insurance litigation, showing that the number of cases filed
have tripled in the past 5 years).
102
Kesan, supra note 2, at n. 241.
103
See, e.g., Lorraine Armenti and Steven Cantarutti, The Evolution of Cyber Coverage Law: A
Survey of Critical Decisions and the Market’s Response, ABA LITIGATION COMMITTEE (Nov 21, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigation-committees/insurancecoverage/articles/2016/fall2016-cyber-coverage.html []; Andrew G. Simpson, Fallout from Travelers
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course, to be expected. But given the multiplicity of actors in the
cybersecurity ecosystem, insurers’ efforts to cabin the breadth of their
policies limits the regulatory effect of their policies.
Another reason that these policies are often limited is that there is
dramatic uncertainty as to the actual risk exposure associated with cyberincidents. In the context of data breaches, for instance, estimates for the perrecord cost of a data breach range from several dollars per record breached
to several hundred dollars per record breached.104 Such a potential range of
liability makes it difficult for insurers to construct useful actuarial tables—
and therefore limits the range of risks that insurers are willing to underwrite.
This is further compounded by the uncertain legal liability faced as a
result of a cyber-incident. As discussed in Section II.B, legal institutions
have struggled to adapt to the cybersecurity context. Courts routinely
dismiss cases for lack of standing or articulable harm, and where losses are
clear the economic loss doctrine often limits recovery.105 These issues are
compounded by adding in insurance contracts, where the terms of these
contracts need to be interpreted and given meaning in a new setting—a task
with which courts have struggled in recent years.106 The law, however,
continues to evolve, and it is entirely possible that, in any given case, a court
may break from the short-lived history of cases in this area and find—
potentially substantial—liability. This, again, limits the accuracy of
insurers’ actuarial tables, and therefore the policies that insurers are willing
to underwrite.
A final limitation on the cybersecurity risks that insurers are willing to
underwrite is that many risks relating to cybersecurity are correlated. This
means that that if one insured is likely to experience a loss, other insureds
are similarly likely. This results from the interconnected nature of the
Internet and the nature of many cyber-incidents. Any given security
vulnerability is likely to affect a large number of insured and exploitation of
these vulnerabilities often targets many potential targets simultaneously. A
contemporary example is ransomware, which is generally distributed widely
by e-mail. A year ago, insurers may not have experienced any ransomware
related losses, but today those losses may be widespread across a large
CGL Cyber Ruling: Insurance Buyers and Sellers Beware, INSURANCE J. (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/04/25/406262.htm []; Sistrunk, supra note 101.
104
See PAUL HERSHBERGER, DATA BREACH IMPACT ESTIMATION 3, 10–11, 13 (2016),
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dlp/data-breach-impact-estimation-37502 (discussing
the overall cost of data breaches to various organizations and estimating the cost per record breached).
105
See, e.g., Christopher Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty
Law From Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591, 591 (1994) (discussing how the economic
loss doctrine limits recovery in instances where there is no physical injury to the plaintiff); Opderbeck,
supra note 35 (discussing various challenges that face cybersecurity related litigation, focusing on the
economic loss doctrine).
106
See supra, note 98.
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number of insureds. A fundamental principle of risk pooling is that risks
cannot be correlated—the fact that one party experiences a loss cannot
suggest that others are more likely to experience the same loss. Because
many cybersecurity risks are correlated, insurers are, once again, cautious to
write broad policies.
V. AN INTEGRATED SOLUTION: CYBERENSURING SECURITY
Sections III and IV discussed the use of strict liability and insurance to
address cybersecurity problems. Each has both important positive attributes
but also substantial shortcomings. Section V turns to putting these concepts
together. Strict liability and insurance have long been recognized to be
related concepts—so much so that strict liability is often viewed as a form
of insurance.
This discussion begins with an overview of the relationship between
strict liability and insurance. This relationship yields a specific policy
proposal. Strict liability and cyber insurance are complementary approaches
improving the cybersecurity ecosystem. This complementarity can be
leveraged by using a strict-liability regime for cybersecurity incidents to
promote the development of a more robust cyber insurance marketplace. The
“glue” that ties these two mechanisms together is a nuanced damages
regime: defendants under the strict-liability regime would face blunt,
unforgiving, statutory damages, unless they had an effective cyber-insurance
policy, in which case their damages would be limited to the lesser of those
statutory damages or actual, provable, damages. The last portion of this
Section evaluates this mechanism against the concerns discussed in Sections
III and IV.
A. Strict Liability as Insurance
The intuitive understanding of strict liability is that it is meant to place
the burden of avoiding harm on the more sophisticated party in a
relationship—generally the party with greater knowledge about the risks
associated with the use of a given product or service. The traditional example
is of a dangerous product such as a power tool, which may have some latent
defect or require non-obvious training in order to be used safely. Ordinary
consumers reasonably need to use such products, but are frequently ill
equipped to do so safely. Strict liability seemingly places the burden of
ensuring the safety of such products on the manufacturer—the sophisticated
party—to ensure that the manufacturer goes beyond the requirements of
107

Lee Matthews, 2016 Saw An Insane Rise In The Number Of Ransomware Attacks, FORBES (Feb.
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ordinary negligence to also ensure that the product is safe for consumers
who may themselves be negligent. This seemingly reasonable understanding
is explained on the grounds that the sophisticated party is in a better position
to mitigate such harm than its counterparties, so the burden should be placed
on the sophisticated party. As Justice Traynor, the author of the Greenman
opinion commonly heralded as establishing modern strict liability, wrote in
an earlier (concurring) opinion, the one in which he first articulated his
concept of strict liability: “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market.”108
But this is not, in fact, how strict liability operates. Following early
adoption of modern forms of strict liability, legal scholars realized—both
through theoretical and empirical research—that strict liability does not
induce firms (or other parties subject to strict liability) to take greater care
to avoid harm than ordinary negligence.109 The reason for this is simple:
ordinary negligence encourages firms to take precautions commensurate
with the expected likelihood and magnitude of harm. In other words, under
ordinary negligence, firms will invest up to $50 to avoid a 1-in-10 likelihood
a $500 harm (that is, an expected $50 in harm). Counterintuitively, however,
the transition to strict liability does not change this: a firm will not invest
$60 to prevent an expected $50 in harm. Rather, it makes more economic
sense for a firm to invest $50 in precaution, hope that the harm does not
come to pass, and, if it does come to pass, write a check to the harmed party.
Strict liability, in other words, does not increase either party’s incentives
to take precautions against harm. Indeed, unless it is implemented with a
contributory-negligence defense, it can encourage negligent behavior on the
part of the non-liable party, since that party knows it is effectively insured
against harm by the strictly liable party.110 Rather than affect parties’
incentives, strict liability’s real effect is to shift risk of harm from one party
108
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
109
See Epstein, supra note 3, at 653 (discussing the moral hazard posed by the proliferation of
insurance, namely that insurance often encourages a person to engage in riskier behavior); Priest, supra
note 3, at 1582–87 (discussing how the increase in tort liability did not lead to an increase in care taken,
it only lead to firms losing their insurance due to high premiums and removing their products from the
market); Shavell, supra note 3, at 124–26 (discussing how strict liability and negligence impact
tortfeasor’s actions).
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See John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973);
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to another.
The practical consequence of shifting risk in this way is that strictly
liable parties become insurers for their counterparties.111 This is most easily
seen in the case of strict products liability. In the first instance, firms will
invest in precautions—such as designing their products to minimize the risk
of harm through ordinary use—up to that point where the investment in
precautions equals the expected likelihood and magnitude of harm. Beyond
investing in cost-effective precautions against foreseeable harms, firms will
also set aside a portion of their revenues to cover the cost of foreseeable
harms that cannot be cost-effectively mitigated. Thus, a firm will invest $50
in precaution to avoid a 1-in-10 chance of a $500 harm (or, more precisely,
to minimize the expected likelihood and magnitude of harm as a function of
the incremental cost of investment in precautions), but it will also set aside
$50 for each unit that it sells in order to compensate the one in ten consumers
whom harm is expected to befall. Critically, that $50 set aside for each unit
sold does not come from the manufacturer. Instead, the manufacturer passes
those costs along to the consumer, increasing the price of its products in
order to meet the strict-liability regime’s demand that it insure consumers
against harm.
In the products-liability market, this is exactly how strict liability works:
firms purchase third-party insurance for the users of their products and
incorporate the cost of this insurance into their products’ prices.112
In effect, adopting a strict-liability regime is equivalent to adopting a
mandate that parties have insurance against harms that may befall others
with whom they interact. That is, strict liability is effectively a mandate for
third-party cyber insurance—precisely the sort of insurance that is most
likely to yield improvements to the cybersecurity ecosystem, but also
precisely the sort of insurance that insurers have been most reluctant to
underwrite.
Such a mandate makes sense in many contexts. In the products liability
context, for instance, manufacturers have much greater ability to inspect
their products and detect latent defects, or to provide basic instruction on the
safe use of their products. Even more important, however, they are in a better
position to understand the risks of using their products and provide (or
purchase) insurance against those risks. It would be very costly to expect the
relatively large number of consumers in the economy to research and
purchase separate insurance policies for each product they happen to buy—
111
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indeed, in most cases more costly than the value of the product to the
consumer. On the other hand, it is relatively inexpensive to require a
relatively small number manufacturers to purchase third-party policies. And,
on the insurer side, it is relatively costly to negotiate individual policies for
individual consumers, each of whom has highly individualized
characteristics—but it is relatively inexpensive to negotiate a third-party
policy for a large pool of consumers.
The same analysis holds in the cybersecurity context. As was discussed
in Section I.D, the difficulties of assigning and quantifying risk under the
negligence regime has allowed relatively sophisticated parties to
systematically externalize risk onto relatively unsophisticated parties. Under
today’s model, sophisticated parties underinvest in security and impose the
cost of security risks on to unsophisticated parties. And as seen in Section
IV, this same pattern has followed into cyber-insurance markets.
This brings us to the key difference between traditional third-party
insurance policies and strict liability as insurance: under a traditional
insurance policy, coverage is defined and limited by the insurance contract;
under a strict liability model, however, coverage is defined by a court’s
willingness and ability to award damages. Thus, third-party insurance
policies may typically cover things such as medical expenses, but are likely
to exclude or cap more speculative economic and other non-economic
losses. Courts, on the other hand, are more likely and able to award broad
economic and non-economic damages.
In the products liability context, in the 1980s this difference proved
disastrous.113 But in the cybersecurity context, this overbreadth of coverage
may prove to be a redeeming virtue. The most basic challenges of
cybersecurity stem from the multiplicity of actors in the ecosystem, the ease
with which they can externalize risk between one another, and the high
transaction costs (and difficult litigation environment) that faces anyone
seeking to recover damages from malfeasant parties in such an environment.
Insurers, it turns out, are uniquely well situated to undertake such an effort—
but are only likely to do so if the various risks externalized upon the
ecosystem are internalized upon them in a way that they cannot be avoided
through contractual exclusion.
B. Cyberensuring Security: A Unified Model of Strict Cyberliability and
Cyber-insurance
1. Strict Liability as a Complement to Cyber-insurance
Sections III and IV of this Article considered the use of strict liability
113
See generally Priest, supra note 3 (arguing that adoption of strict products liability since the
1960s drove third-party insurance premiums to unaffordable levels because insurers were forced to cover
losses ordinarily excluded from insurance coverage, consequentially rendering insurance unavailable to
many).
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and cyber insurance, respectively, to improve the overall quality of the
cybersecurity ecosystem. There are reasons to believe that each would be an
improvement over the status quo—a status quo in which the parties in the
best positions to improve cybersecurity face few incentives to do so and in
which those parties that do face incentives to improve cybersecurity have
little ability to do so. A strict-liability regime could reduce or eliminate the
myriad obstacles to bringing a successful suit in response to a security
incident; obstacles such as establishing standing, causation, and overcoming
the economic loss doctrine.114 Additionally, an insurance regime inserts a
layer of parties into the ecosystem—the insurers—that have an interest in
systematically studying and quantifying risks, disseminating knowledge
about avoiding them, and pushing for changes that reduce these risks
altogether.
We also saw that there are obstacles to adopting either approach. Strict
liability would likely need to be implemented by statute, and a strict-liability
regime does nothing to resolve the difficulties of determining damages for
cybersecurity related harms. And insurers, both facing uncertain legal
liability for harms that may befall their insureds and also facing the same
uncertainty of indeterminate damages, tend to write narrow policies that do
little to address the risks of the broader ecosystem.
The recognition that strict liability is a form of third-party insurance
suggests that these approaches may be used jointly, in a way that reinforces
the positive attributes of each while helping to overcome their respective
limitations. As a form of insurance, strict liability is inherently outward
looking, it requires firms to insure others against risks that may occur on the
firm’s own network or in its software. This would drive demand for broad
third-party cyber-insurance policies, which in turn creates the incentive for
insurers to work to reduce the risks that inhere in the cybersecurity
ecosystem. What is more, treating these harms under a strict liability rule
reduces the uncertainty that insurers face, making it easier for them to
underwrite policies. These same effects hold even for firms that choose not
to purchase a cyber-insurance policy; such firms are merely electing to selfinsure against these same harms.
2. How We Get There: A Policy Proposal
Unfortunately, there is no way around the fact that a strict-liability
regime can only realistically be implemented on a statutory basis. Policy
proposals that are contingent upon legislative action—as this one is—are
rightly subject to criticism; they are implicitly infeasible and are unlikely to
be implemented except in exceptional circumstances. The cybersecurity
challenge is such a circumstance. And an effective statutory liability rule
114
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that would have very dramatic effect can be implemented narrowly.
The essential element of such a statute is that any individual or firm
holding records or information about third parties be liable to those parties
in the event of a data breach. Data breaches are only one of the many types
of potential security incidents that occur on a regular basis. They are,
however, a “perfect storm” of the problems facing the cybersecurity
ecosystem. Almost every firm today holds consumer information in
electronic form, but few of these firms have sophisticated cybersecurity
expertise. Rather, they are beholden to the poor incentives of others in the
ecosystem to develop and provide them with secure and usable systems. At
the same time, they are in the best position relative to their customers to
protect their systems and the data stored on them. And, given the indirect
relationships between these various parties and the uncertain harms of data
disclosure, the prospect of successful litigation under existing legal
standards is low. As described in Section III.C, this is a prototypical setting
for the use of strict liability.
3. Cyber-insurance as a complement to strict liability
Merely implementing a statutory strict-liability rule leaves unresolved
the question of damages. As we have seen, the appropriate measure of
damages is one of the most substantial challenges facing any liability
regime.115 The simplest way of addressing this is to impose statutory
damages alongside the statutory strict-liability regime. But any statutory
measure of damages is unlikely to be anywhere near correct. Indeed,
inevitably incorrect statutory damages would generally be sufficient reason
alone to reject most statute-based policy proposals.
Here, the relationship between strict liability and insurance provides an
alternative approach. A key reason that it is difficult to determine an accurate
measure of damages is that there is a lack of actual data about the consumer
costs of data breaches. Insurance companies are in the business of collecting,
analyzing, and using just this sort of data—this is, in a very real way, the
heart of the insurance business. This expertise can be leveraged here.
Rather than impose statutory damages, a statutory strict-liability rule
should be accompanied by presumptive but rebuttable statutory damages.
Under this model, an appropriate agency—such as the FTC, which has
substantial experience investigating data breaches—would be tasked with
developing a schedule of presumptive damages for different sorts of data
that can be compromised in data breaches.116 In constructing this schedule,
the agency would be instructed to err on the side of finding liability for
115
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damages even in the absence of substantial evidence supporting such
damages, but not in the face of countervailing substantial evidence that
damages are in fact less. Any firm that experiences a breach would be subject
to these damages unless it had a cyber-insurance policy that covered the
third-party harms, in which case damages would be assessed as actual
provable damages, with the statutory damages as a backstop in the event that
there was insufficient evidence to establish actual damages.
C. Evaluating Cyberensured Security
The policy proposed above is designed to take advantage of—indeed, to
“supercharge”—the relationship between strict liability and insurance. The
imposition of strict liability for certain cybersecurity incidents effectively
imposes a third-party liability insurance requirement on firms holding
consumer data. This requirement, in turn, would create a substantial demand
for comprehensive third-party liability insurance policies. As insurers enter
this market, the presumptive statutory damages would create an incentive
for insurers to collect and put to use data on actual damages—providing
much needed information that is currently lacking in current cybersecurity
research. And insurers would also have their traditional incentives to
improve their insureds’ practices and the overall quality of the security
ecosystem in order to reduce their exposure to risk. No one else today is in
a position to undertake these efforts on a systematic basis.
This policy does have important limitations and possible challenges.
Most important, by design this would only impose liability on consumerfacing entities that host consumer data. This is in part paean to practicality.
A greater scope of liability would make it more difficult for an idea such as
this to actually be implemented. And this also focuses attention on the part
of the cybersecurity ecosystem where attention both is arguably most needed
and will be most effective.
This is not to say that this policy would not have effects throughout the
broader ecosystem. As an initial matter, the relationship between the
multiplicity of actors that make up the ecosystem would continue to be
governed by contract. Today, these contracts generally broadly disclaim
liability for security-related incidents. This is in part a reflection of the
general lack of liability in the ecosystem—sophisticated firms, knowing that
they are unlikely to face significant liability should they experience a breach,
are unconcerned about contractually waiving liability claims, and less
sophisticated firms are generally not in a position to negotiate alternative
terms. This dynamic would likely change, however, under an insurance
model; insurers would both understand, and be in a position to insist upon,
more favorable terms to protect their insureds (and themselves). What is
more, the insurers are in a position to litigate these terms.
A final concern that must be acknowledged about this approach is that
it could expose firms to a literally overwhelming amount of risk—enough
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risk that insurers would refuse to underwrite it and that firms subject to
liability would go out of business. This is, in fact, what happened in many
industries subject to strict liability rules in the 1980s.117 If a contemporary
manifestation of the insurance crisis of the 1980s does occur, it is
unquestionably the case that a change in policy would be necessary. In and
of itself, however, this occurrence would be important data for how we
should develop new policy. If the scope of cyber-insecurity and related data
losses is so great that these losses are uninsurable, that raises fundamental
questions about the nature of the Internet economy.
In this way, a policy such as this focuses attention directly upon what is
the uncertain, and uncomfortable, question at the core of the modern
economy: how sensitive and valuable are the trillions of bits of information
about billions of people hosted on millions of insecure computers around the
world? In the eyes of many, this information is incredibly valuable, and the
potential harms that individuals face from its misuse or appropriation are
substantial; to others, this information has nearly zero value, and whatever
harms its misuse or compromise yield are anyhow ephemeral, intangible,
and insufficiently concrete to justify any damages. Under the former view,
we are woefully underinvesting in security—or, more likely, the entire
edifice of the Internet is a ticking time bomb of impending, and uninsurable,
cyber-liability. In either event, pushing the market to internalize whatever
liability exists through express liability and insurance mechanisms can only
serve to improve upon the status quo.
CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity is among the most challenging, most important, issues of
the day. Cyber insurance and strict liability for certain types of cyber
incidents are among the approaches frequently discussed to address the
challenge of cybersecurity. Neither approach on its own, however, has yet
managed to achieve its potential. Imposing strict liability—a step that no
court or regulator has yet taken—for instance, leaves unaddressed complex
questions of damages. And left to its own devices, the cyber-insurance
market will narrow the policies it underwrites to avoid the most difficult (and
most important to address) aspects of the cybersecurity ecosystem.
This Article’s key contribution to the issue is the observation that strict
liability and cyber insurance are complementary sides of a single coin. It
turns out that insurance and strict liability are intimately related, however—
and that they are related in ways that allow each to complement and correct
the weaknesses in the other. This observation offers helpful insights into
ongoing discussions about both strict liability and cyber insurance—insights
that are useful to both subject areas independently, as well as important as a
117
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way to bring these discussions under a common framework.
Drawing from these insights, this Article has proposed a strict-liability
rule for harms deriving from cyber-incidents. Under this rule, consumerfacing firms that use or store consumer information would be strictly liable
to those consumers for any security incidents (i.e., data breaches) involving
that data. In order to work, this rule would impose administratively defined
statutory damages, but firms that have cyber insurance policies covering
third-party harms would only pay the lesser of those statutory damages or
actual provable damages for insured claims.
The characteristics of this model compare favorably to the current status
quo—one wherein users are largely helpless, firms are largely
unknowledgeable, software is generally insecure, federal agencies are
generally impotent to bring about meaningful change in the structure and
operation of private markets, and attackers are largely judgement-proof.

